CROSS-BORDER JUSTICE / RESEARCH REPORT
Infographic showing the 16-country directional cooperation matrix and a QR code linking to this report. A full text matrix and explanations follow below.
Rows provide assistance → columns receive assistance.Open full-size infographic ↗

EVIDENCE • METHODS • LIMITATIONS

Law enforcement cooperation,
direction by direction.

Transfers of wanted persons, legal assistance and police cooperation assessed separately, with sources and explicit limits on what each case establishes.

16 countries240 directions112 scored128 unknownResearch cutoff: 15 October 2026

English translation of the supplied report. Scores, qualifications and source links are preserved; translation and formatting do not constitute a new verification of the cited research. null means insufficient evidence, not zero cooperation.

Practical Law Enforcement Cooperation: 16 Countries

Research cutoff and verification date for new sources: 15 October 2026. A → B means that A provides a person, information or assistance to the authorities of B. Matrix rows represent the transferring / assisting side; columns represent the receiving / assisted side. For transfers of people, the direction literally means A → B; for J and P, it is assistance, not a person, that is transferred.

The additions are Japan, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Spain. Total: 16 countries and 240 directions, including 184 new directions; 112 numerical scores and 128 null values. The new block contains 68 numerical scores and 116 null values. It covers all 56 directions among the eight new countries and all 128 directions between the new and original countries.

Scope of the update. The original 56 values were carried over unchanged; their primary sources were not fully reverified. New directions were checked separately against public sources. The original report is retained in the archival appendix to preserve the explanations for the earlier values. Its conclusions about eight countries and its counts of 56/44/12 apply only to the original block. The current expanded matrix appears below and in the JSON file.

How to read the results. These are expert assessments of observed assistance, not probabilities of extradition. A high score based only on P or J does not establish transfers of people. null means insufficient verified evidence, not zero cooperation or lower willingness. Public-source gaps are especially large for reverse directions and do not support ranking countries by their average row score.

Main findings of the supplement

  • Japan has confirmed transfers to the United States, South Korea, Germany and, historically, Russia; transfers to Japan from the United States, Indonesia and Vietnam are also confirmed. Source age and quality vary: N01–N11.
  • South Korea appears as both a receiving and a transferring side: completed transfers from the United States, Russia, Japan, Vietnam, the UAE and, historically, France and Malaysia; transfers from Korea to the United States and Vietnam. The British arrest counts only as P: N03–N17.
  • For Saudi Arabia, a transfer from Russia is confirmed, as is a historical, politically sensitive return from Malaysia. The direction toward Turkey includes both older transfers and a substantive refusal. The general P assessment with Spain remains low-confidence: N22–N26.
  • Vietnam has several confirmed transfers to China, as well as completed transfers to the United States, Japan and South Korea. For Russia and France, general confirmation of ongoing police cooperation was found, but not a sufficient extradition record: N11–N21.
  • European directions cannot be reduced to a single assessment. EncroChat confirms evidentiary assistance by France; JuicyFields confirms joint investigations. Transfers from Spain to Russia in 2023 and from France in 2025 are separately confirmed, with different subject matter and limitations: N34–N37, N46–N50.

Method and comparability

Main period: 15 October 2021–15 October 2026. Older episodes are retained under the original study's rule as evidence of a channel that once operated; failure to find its termination does not establish continuous operation. An assessment of an older channel is marked low-confidence. Confidence concerns generalization about a direction, not the reliability of a single event. No new generalization received high confidence.

Component Observed action Weight
E Completed transfer of a wanted person, including deportation linked to a criminal request; substantive refusals and functioning judicial procedures are separately identified 0.60
J Executed legal assistance, transfer of evidence or criminal assets 0.25
P Police information exchange, operational assistance, joint investigation 0.15

score = round_half_up(Σ(weight × component) / Σ(weight of known components), 1). Unknown components are excluded from both numerator and denominator. When only P is known, the final score equals P. In tables, ? means an unknown component; null means insufficient evidence for any component. A single episode is not automatically counted under E, J and P simultaneously.

The scale is unchanged: 1 — near-total breakdown; 2 — extremely low level; 3 — severely restricted channels; 4 — selective cooperation; 5 — functioning but uneven; 6 — confirmed, appreciable assistance; 7 — repeated practice; 8 — highly developed cooperation; 9 — intensive, broad cooperation; 10 — the closest confirmed cooperation. Scores are analytical interpretations, not figures published by sources. Half-points do not imply statistical precision.

In the new block, a recent, single completed episode generally yields E=6; a series of distinct completed cases, E=7; an older completed channel, E=5.5 with low confidence; and a substantive judicial procedure without confirmed handover, E=5 with a specific note. Politically narrow episodes and refusals are assessed individually. A specific operation generally yields P=6; general official confirmation of ongoing exchange yields a provisional P=5. These rules do not replace examination of the facts.

Reciprocal P/J scores were assigned only where a source describes bilateral work or members of the same joint investigation team, rather than merely listing countries in an international operation. Equal reverse scores then reflect limited source detail, not proven equal intensity. Citizenship is not inferred from a name; unspecified citizenship is not used to draw conclusions about extraditing a country's own nationals.

Completeness limitation: this was a public-source search, not access to all national request registers. For most directions, the number of requests, refusal rates, all individuals' citizenship and execution times are unknown. The search did not establish sufficient evidence for null cells; this does not prove that no cases exist. Differences in publication availability cannot independently measure a state's willingness to cooperate.

Country codes

Code Country Block
US United States Original
RU Russia Original
CN China Original
AE United Arab Emirates Original
RS Serbia Original
MY Malaysia Original
ID Indonesia Original
TR Turkey Original
JP Japan Added
KR South Korea Added
SA Saudi Arabia Added
VN Vietnam Added
DE Germany Added
FR France Added
GB United Kingdom Added
ES Spain Added

Full matrix

The matrix is split by receiving columns for readability; both parts contain the same 16 transferring sides. “—” denotes an excluded self-relationship.

Recipient: US, RU, CN, AE, RS, MY, ID, TR

A → B US RU CN AE RS MY ID TR
US — 3.4 6.0 6.0 5.0 6.6 5.0 5.0
RU 3.0 — 6.0 5.5 5.5 null null 6.0
CN 6.0 6.0 — 5.0 null 6.0 6.0 null
AE 6.0 6.0 6.5 — 6.0 null null null
RS 6.0 7.0 6.0 6.0 — null 6.0 5.0
MY 6.5 5.0 5.5 null null — 7.0 5.0
ID 5.5 5.7 7.0 null 5.5 5.5 — null
TR 6.0 7.0 4.0 6.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 —
JP 5.5 5.5 null null null null null null
KR 6.0 null 6.0 null null null null null
SA null null null null null null null 4.0
VN 6.0 5.0 7.0 null null null null null
DE 6.8 3.0 null null 6.0 null null 7.0
FR 6.0 4.0 null null 5.0 null null 5.5
GB 6.0 null null null 5.0 null null 6.0
ES 7.0 6.0 5.5 null null null null 5.5

Recipient: JP, KR, SA, VN, DE, FR, GB, ES

A → B JP KR SA VN DE FR GB ES
US 5.5 6.0 null null 6.0 5.0 5.5 5.5
RU null 6.0 6.0 5.0 5.5 null null null
CN null 5.5 null null null null null null
AE null 6.0 null 6.0 null 7.0 6.0 null
RS null null null null 6.0 5.0 5.0 null
MY null 5.5 4.0 null null null null null
ID 6.0 null null null null null null 6.0
TR null null null null null null null null
JP — 6.0 null null 6.0 null null null
KR null — null 6.0 null null null null
SA null null — null null null null 5.0
VN 6.0 6.0 null — null 5.0 null null
DE null null null null — 6.0 null 6.0
FR null 5.5 null 5.0 7.3 — 7.3 6.0
GB 5.0 6.0 null null 6.0 6.0 — 6.0
ES null null 5.0 null 6.0 6.0 6.8 —

This section explains the limits of generalizing from precedents. A treaty, EU membership or Interpol participation does not itself earn a score. Conditions must be checked as of the specific request, not merely by citizenship or political relations.

Country Interpretive limitation and legal authority
Japan Absence of a general treaty must not be treated as an absolute bar to every transfer; different grounds for cooperation exist. Own nationals have been transferred to US and KR (N02, N08). Japan Ministry of Justice: overview of international criminal cooperation. The overview is historical, not an exhaustive treaty register as of 2026.
South Korea The law distinguishes mandatory and discretionary grounds for refusal; citizenship is among the discretionary grounds, so an absolute prohibition is not assumed. UNODC SHERLOC, Articles 5–10-2. The applicable version and treaty must be checked separately.
Saudi Arabia Restrictions depend on the law and treaty. SAMA: extradition provisions for money-laundering cases cannot be generalized to all offence categories without verification. Receiving a Saudi citizen from Russia does not establish Saudi Arabia's extradition of its own citizens.
Vietnam Official publication of Extradition Law No. 100/2025/QH15 requires attention to applicable conditions and the transition between legal regimes. Older events cannot automatically be described under a new rule. Deportation and sentenced-prisoner transfers are considered separately.
Germany Basic Law, Article 16(2) permits specific exceptions to German citizens' protection for surrender to the EU or an international court. Extraditions of foreigners to Turkey and the United States do not characterize Germans' position.
France Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 696-4 contains citizenship and other refusal grounds for ordinary extradition. The European Arrest Warrant regime is considered separately; transfer of digital evidence does not mean extradition.
United Kingdom After Brexit, applicable mechanisms with the EU must be considered separately from the former EAW regime. CPS: extradition from the United Kingdom. The special arrangement in Japanese case N09 is not a universal treaty.
Spain A uniform regime cannot be assumed for intra-EU relations and relations with third countries. European Commission: European Arrest Warrant; Treaty with Vietnam. Chinese cases require individual assessment; see N50.

All 184 new directions: components and evidence

This section is grouped by the providing side. For the original eight countries, only new recipients are shown; for new countries, all 15 recipients are shown. This avoids double counting and explicitly covers both sides of every relationship. N/G source codes are expanded in the register below.

US — United States as the providing side

Direction E J P Score Confidence Evidence / limitation
US → JP 5.5 ? ? 5.5 low Completed extradition; an older, single episode. N01
US → KR 6.0 ? ? 6.0 medium Confirmed transfer in 2023. N03
US → SA ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
US → VN ? ? ? null low Confirmation of the reverse direction is not automatically transferable; execution of E/J/P in this specific direction has not been established. —
US → DE ? ? 6.0 6.0 medium Joint investigation; E and J were not assessed. N28
US → FR 5.0 ? ? 5.0 low Judicial admissibility; actual transfer has not been confirmed. N30
US → GB 5.5 ? ? 5.5 low An older official series, excluding Scotland; current continuity has not been measured. N52
US → ES 5.5 ? ? 5.5 low An older completed extradition involving a special category of offences. N32

RU — Russia as the providing side

Direction E J P Score Confidence Evidence / limitation
RU → JP ? ? ? null low Confirmation of the reverse direction is not automatically transferable; execution of E/J/P in this specific direction has not been established. —
RU → KR 6.0 ? ? 6.0 medium The transfer is confirmed by an Interior Ministry statement reported by Interfax. N05
RU → SA 6.0 ? ? 6.0 medium Completed transfer of a Saudi national. N22
RU → VN ? ? 5.0 5.0 low Official description of reciprocal practice, without a register of operations. N20
RU → DE 5.5 ? ? 5.5 low An older completed transfer; current recurrence is unknown. N48
RU → FR ? ? ? null low Confirmation of the reverse direction is not automatically transferable; execution of E/J/P in this specific direction has not been established. —
RU → GB ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
RU → ES ? ? ? null low Confirmation of the reverse direction is not automatically transferable; execution of E/J/P in this specific direction has not been established. —

CN — China as the providing side

Direction E J P Score Confidence Evidence / limitation
CN → JP ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
CN → KR 5.5 ? ? 5.5 low An older completed transfer in a criminal case. N53
CN → SA ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
CN → VN ? ? ? null low Return after serving a local sentence does not sufficiently confirm execution of Vietnam's request. G02
CN → DE ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
CN → FR ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
CN → GB ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
CN → ES ? ? ? null low Confirmation of the reverse direction is not automatically transferable; execution of E/J/P in this specific direction has not been established. —

AE — United Arab Emirates as the providing side

Direction E J P Score Confidence Evidence / limitation
AE → JP ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
AE → KR 6.0 ? ? 6.0 medium Two suspects delivered to South Korea. N15
AE → SA ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
AE → VN 6.0 ? ? 6.0 medium Transfer following a criminal search; one episode. N14
AE → DE ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
AE → FR 7.0 ? ? 7.0 medium An agency-reported series relayed by the media; coverage of requests is unknown. N44
AE → GB 6.0 ? ? 6.0 medium Completed extradition confirmed by the receiving prosecution service. N43
AE → ES ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —

RS — Serbia as the providing side

Direction E J P Score Confidence Evidence / limitation
RS → JP ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
RS → KR ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
RS → SA ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
RS → VN ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
RS → DE ? 6.0 ? 6.0 medium Reciprocal execution of assistance in one joint case. N38
RS → FR ? ? 5.0 5.0 low Official description of ongoing exchange without a case register. N39
RS → GB ? ? 5.0 5.0 low Reciprocal official confirmation of practice; limited detail. N40
RS → ES ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —

MY — Malaysia as the providing side

Direction E J P Score Confidence Evidence / limitation
MY → JP ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
MY → KR 5.5 ? ? 5.5 low An older group transfer. N16
MY → SA 4.0 ? ? 4.0 low Older, narrow evidence; not an indicator of ordinary criminal extradition. N25
MY → VN ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
MY → DE ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
MY → FR ? ? ? null low A treaty framework or negotiations were found; practical execution in this direction was not established. G04
MY → GB ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
MY → ES ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —

ID — Indonesia as the providing side

Direction E J P Score Confidence Evidence / limitation
ID → JP 6.0 ? ? 6.0 medium Deportation with confirmed handover to Japanese police. N10
ID → KR ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
ID → SA ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
ID → VN ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
ID → DE ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
ID → FR ? ? ? null low Transfer of the sentenced prisoner Atlaoui is not extradition pursuant to a French criminal request. G03
ID → GB ? ? ? null low GLS's deportation does not establish a British criminal request; separate assistance to GB was not identified. G03, N51
ID → ES ? ? 6.0 6.0 medium Arrest following a Spanish search; this source does not prove handover. N51

TR — Turkey as the providing side

Direction E J P Score Confidence Evidence / limitation
TR → JP ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
TR → KR ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
TR → SA ? ? ? null low A decision to transfer proceedings is confirmed, but separate execution is not. G06
TR → VN ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
TR → DE ? ? ? null low Confirmation of the reverse direction is not automatically transferable; execution of E/J/P in this specific direction has not been established. —
TR → FR ? ? ? null low Confirmation of the reverse direction is not automatically transferable; execution of E/J/P in this specific direction has not been established. —
TR → GB ? ? ? null low Confirmation of the reverse direction is not automatically transferable; execution of E/J/P in this specific direction has not been established. —
TR → ES ? ? ? null low Confirmation of the reverse direction is not automatically transferable; execution of E/J/P in this specific direction has not been established. —

JP — Japan as the providing side

Direction E J P Score Confidence Evidence / limitation
JP → US 5.5 ? ? 5.5 low Completed extradition of own nationals; older evidence. N02
JP → RU 5.5 ? ? 5.5 low An older completed transfer; current continuity is unknown. N06
JP → CN ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
JP → AE ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
JP → RS ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
JP → MY ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
JP → ID ? ? ? null low Confirmation of the reverse direction is not automatically transferable; execution of E/J/P in this specific direction has not been established. —
JP → TR ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
JP → KR 6.0 ? ? 6.0 low Transfer reported by the media; a Japanese national. N08
JP → SA ? ? ? null low A treaty framework or negotiations were found; practical execution in this direction was not established. G04
JP → VN ? ? ? null low A transfer of a sentenced prisoner to serve a sentence was found; this is a different mechanism, and E/J/P were not established. G01
JP → DE 6.0 ? ? 6.0 low Report of a completed transfer; limited primary-source verifiability. N07
JP → FR ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
JP → GB ? ? ? null low Confirmation of the reverse direction is not automatically transferable; execution of E/J/P in this specific direction has not been established. —
JP → ES ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —

KR — South Korea as the providing side

Direction E J P Score Confidence Evidence / limitation
KR → US 6.0 ? ? 6.0 medium Completed extradition of a third-country national. N04
KR → RU ? ? ? null low Confirmation of the reverse direction is not automatically transferable; execution of E/J/P in this specific direction has not been established. —
KR → CN 6.0 ? ? 6.0 medium Actual handover to Chinese authorities following a request. N54
KR → AE ? ? ? null low Confirmation of the reverse direction is not automatically transferable; execution of E/J/P in this specific direction has not been established. —
KR → RS ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
KR → MY ? ? ? null low Confirmation of the reverse direction is not automatically transferable; execution of E/J/P in this specific direction has not been established. —
KR → ID ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
KR → TR ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
KR → JP ? ? ? null low Confirmation of the reverse direction is not automatically transferable; execution of E/J/P in this specific direction has not been established. —
KR → SA ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
KR → VN 6.0 ? ? 6.0 medium Transfer of a wanted person confirmed by the receiving agency. N13
KR → DE ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
KR → FR ? ? ? null low Confirmation of the reverse direction is not automatically transferable; execution of E/J/P in this specific direction has not been established. —
KR → GB ? ? ? null low Confirmation of the reverse direction is not automatically transferable; execution of E/J/P in this specific direction has not been established. —
KR → ES ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —

SA — Saudi Arabia as the providing side

Direction E J P Score Confidence Evidence / limitation
SA → US ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
SA → RU ? ? ? null low Confirmation of the reverse direction is not automatically transferable; execution of E/J/P in this specific direction has not been established. —
SA → CN ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
SA → AE ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
SA → RS ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
SA → MY ? ? ? null low Confirmation of the reverse direction is not automatically transferable; execution of E/J/P in this specific direction has not been established. —
SA → ID ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
SA → TR 4.0 ? ? 4.0 low Older transfers and a substantive refusal; a politically narrow evidence base. N23, N24
SA → JP ? ? ? null low A treaty framework or negotiations were found; practical execution in this direction was not established. G04
SA → KR ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
SA → VN ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
SA → DE ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
SA → FR ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
SA → GB ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
SA → ES ? ? 5.0 5.0 low Provisional general confirmation; specific cases are not disclosed. N26

VN — Vietnam as the providing side

Direction E J P Score Confidence Evidence / limitation
VN → US 6.0 ? ? 6.0 medium One confirmed transfer at the request of the United States. N18
VN → RU ? ? 5.0 5.0 low Official description of reciprocal practice, without a register of operations. N20
VN → CN 7.0 ? ? 7.0 medium Several completed episodes in 2025–2026. N18, N19
VN → AE ? ? ? null low Confirmation of the reverse direction is not automatically transferable; execution of E/J/P in this specific direction has not been established. —
VN → RS ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
VN → MY ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
VN → ID ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
VN → TR ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
VN → JP 6.0 ? ? 6.0 medium Two people in one operation, not a demonstrated multiyear series. N11
VN → KR 6.0 ? ? 6.0 medium Completed transfer following a criminal search. N12
VN → SA ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
VN → DE ? ? ? null low The known extralegal removal is excluded; lawful execution of E/J/P has not been established. G05
VN → FR ? ? 5.0 5.0 low Provisional P based on an official overview. N21
VN → GB ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
VN → ES ? ? ? null low A treaty framework or negotiations were found; practical execution in this direction was not established. G04

DE — Germany as the providing side

Direction E J P Score Confidence Evidence / limitation
DE → US 7.0 ? 6.0 6.8 medium A series of extraditions plus a separate joint investigation. N27, N28
DE → RU 3.0 ? ? 3.0 low Substantive refusals according to the requesting side; J/P are unknown. N49
DE → CN ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
DE → AE ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
DE → RS ? 6.0 ? 6.0 medium Reciprocal execution of assistance in one joint case. N38
DE → MY ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
DE → ID ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
DE → TR 7.0 ? ? 7.0 medium A series of executed transfers according to the recipient. N45
DE → JP ? ? ? null low Confirmation of the reverse direction is not automatically transferable; execution of E/J/P in this specific direction has not been established. —
DE → KR ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
DE → SA ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
DE → VN ? ? ? null low The known extralegal removal is excluded; lawful execution of E/J/P has not been established. G05
DE → FR ? 6.0 6.0 6.0 medium Executed investigative measures and a joint investigation. N35, N36
DE → GB ? ? ? null low Confirmation of the reverse direction is not automatically transferable; execution of E/J/P in this specific direction has not been established. —
DE → ES ? ? 6.0 6.0 medium Members of the same joint investigation team; E is unknown. N36

FR — France as the providing side

Direction E J P Score Confidence Evidence / limitation
FR → US 6.0 ? ? 6.0 medium One recent completed episode. N29
FR → RU 4.0 ? ? 4.0 low A confirmed but narrow counterterrorism channel. N46
FR → CN ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
FR → AE ? ? ? null low Confirmation of the reverse direction is not automatically transferable; execution of E/J/P in this specific direction has not been established. —
FR → RS ? ? 5.0 5.0 low Official description of ongoing exchange without a case register. N39
FR → MY ? ? ? null low A treaty framework or negotiations were found; practical execution in this direction was not established. G04
FR → ID ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
FR → TR 5.5 ? ? 5.5 low Completed transfers in 2017; a recent series was not established. N23
FR → JP ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
FR → KR 5.5 ? ? 5.5 low Completed transfer in 2017. N03
FR → SA ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
FR → VN ? ? 5.0 5.0 low Provisional P based on an official overview. N21
FR → DE ? 8.0 6.0 7.3 medium Large-scale transfer of evidence and a separate joint investigation. N34, N36
FR → GB ? 8.0 6.0 7.3 medium Transfer of evidence and a separate bilateral operation. N34, N37
FR → ES ? ? 6.0 6.0 medium Members of the same joint investigation team; E is unknown. N36

GB — United Kingdom as the providing side

Direction E J P Score Confidence Evidence / limitation
GB → US 6.0 ? ? 6.0 medium Completed extradition confirmed by DOJ. N33
GB → RU ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
GB → CN ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
GB → AE ? ? ? null low Confirmation of the reverse direction is not automatically transferable; execution of E/J/P in this specific direction has not been established. —
GB → RS ? ? 5.0 5.0 low Reciprocal official confirmation of practice; limited detail. N40
GB → MY ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
GB → ID ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
GB → TR 6.0 ? ? 6.0 medium One executed transfer according to the recipient. N45
GB → JP 5.0 ? ? 5.0 low Only the judicial procedure is established; extradition is not confirmed. N09
GB → KR ? ? 6.0 6.0 low Arrest in support of a Korean case; E is unknown. N17
GB → SA ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
GB → VN ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
GB → DE 6.0 ? 6.0 6.0 medium Transfer of a person and separate operational assistance. N42, N36
GB → FR ? ? 6.0 6.0 medium Joint operation; reverse transfer of evidence was not established. N37
GB → ES ? ? 6.0 6.0 medium Practical assistance and a joint operation; E is unknown. N36, N51

ES — Spain as the providing side

Direction E J P Score Confidence Evidence / limitation
ES → US 7.0 ? ? 7.0 medium Distinct completed cases; the overall execution rate is unknown. N31
ES → RU 6.0 ? ? 6.0 medium Completed transfer in an ordinary criminal case. N47
ES → CN 5.5 ? ? 5.5 low Both execution and refusals exist; selective practice. N50
ES → AE ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
ES → RS ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
ES → MY ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
ES → ID ? ? ? null low Confirmation of the reverse direction is not automatically transferable; execution of E/J/P in this specific direction has not been established. —
ES → TR 5.5 ? ? 5.5 low Completed transfers in 2017; a recent series was not established. N23
ES → JP ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
ES → KR ? ? ? null low Insufficient verified evidence of execution of E, J or P in this direction; absence of cooperation is not asserted. —
ES → SA ? ? 5.0 5.0 low Provisional general confirmation; specific cases are not disclosed. N26
ES → VN ? ? ? null low A treaty framework or negotiations were found; practical execution in this direction was not established. G04
ES → DE ? ? 6.0 6.0 medium Members of the same joint investigation team; E is unknown. N36
ES → FR ? ? 6.0 6.0 medium Members of the same joint investigation team; E is unknown. N36
ES → GB 7.0 ? 6.0 6.8 medium Distinct completed extraditions and a separate joint operation. N41, N51

Evidence register for new scores and excluded episodes

Statements about charges describe proceedings, not guilt established by this study. An agency press release usually provides good confirmation of an individual event, but weaker evidence of the breadth of practice; media reports and older cases are reflected in confidence assessments. Publications after 15 October 2026 are not used. All links were accessed on 15 October 2026 in the source report.

N01. US → JP: Michael and Peter Taylor, 2021

Two US nationals arrived in Japan on 2 March 2021 after extradition in connection with helping Carlos Ghosn escape. This was a completed episode, but outside the main five-year interval; it does not establish continuous current practice.

N02. JP → US: MRI executives, 2019

DOJ reports the extradition of Japanese nationals Junzo and Paul Suzuki on 17 April 2019 in a Ponzi scheme case. This refutes the assumption that Japan can never extradite its own nationals, but does not establish the frequency of executed requests.

N03. Extraditions to South Korea from the United States and France

South Korea's Ministry of Justice lists completed transfers: Yoo Hyuk Kee from the United States on 4 August 2023 and Yoo Chong Somena from France on 7 June 2017. Earlier US episodes from 2014 do not substitute for current statistics. Confidence in the French episode is reduced because of its age.

N04. KR → US: Vladimir Dunaev, 2021

DOJ confirms the extradition of Russian national Vladimir Dunaev from South Korea on 20 October 2021 in the Trickbot malware case. The transfer falls within the main period. One case does not characterize all US requests.

N05. RU → KR: transfer of a wanted person, 2025

Interfax, citing the Interior Ministry, reports the completed handover to South Korean authorities on 22 January 2025 of a foreign national accused of sexual violence. The available report does not establish his specific citizenship; he cannot be treated as a Russian national.

N06. JP → RU: Vladimir Zolenko, 2019

Russia's Prosecutor General's Office reports that Vladimir Zolenko, wanted in a murder case, was brought from Japan to Moscow on 10 December 2019. This demonstrates a historically functioning channel; the report does not establish its status after 2022.

N07. JP → DE: Qilin suspect, 2026

On 6 October 2026, Jiji, via Nippon.com, reports Japan's transfer to Germany of a Russian suspect connected to Qilin ransomware. The evidence is a media report citing informed sources, not a published statement from the receiving agency.

N08. JP → KR: operator of a piracy website, 2026

On 11 June 2026, Seoul Economic Daily reports the transfer to South Korea of a naturalized Japanese citizen in a case involving pirated comics. A single case does not establish the absence of treaty or citizenship restrictions.

N09. GB → JP: Chappell / Wright, judicial stage

On 5 June 2025, the UK Supreme Court refused permission to appeal in an extradition case concerning Japan. Prisoner-treatment assurances and a special arrangement were considered. The source confirms a functioning procedure, but not the actual handover of the individuals.

N10. ID → JP: Mitsuhiro Taniguchi, 2022

Indonesian police report escorting the deportation of Mitsuhiro Taniguchi, wanted for fraud, on 22 June 2022 through to his handover to Japanese police. The connection between removal and the recipient's criminal proceedings is established.

N11. VN → JP: two wanted persons, 2025

Vietnam's Ministry of Public Security reports the handover to Japanese police on 23 July 2025 of Naka Yoshitaka and Nakanishi Tomochika, wanted by Japanese authorities. The actual transfer counts toward E; a bilateral extradition treaty is not inferred from this event.

N12. VN → KR: murder suspect, 2024

Yonhap reports that a Korean suspect in a Pattaya murder case was brought from Vietnam to South Korea on 24 September 2024. The arrest in Vietnam followed information from South Korean police; the eventual transfer is confirmed.

N13. KR → VN: Nguyen Van Tan, 2024

Vietnam's Ministry of Public Security describes the handover of Nguyen Van Tan by Korean Interpol officers to the Vietnamese side on 27 June 2024 in a bodily-injury case. Citizenship is not inferred from the name or used for legal generalizations.

N14. AE → VN: Dang Quoc Huy, 2024

Vietnam's Ministry of Public Security reports the handover of wanted person Dang Quoc Huy by UAE authorities on 26 June 2024 and his return to Vietnam on 27 June. The case concerns misappropriation of property; the source describes a completed return following a criminal search.

N15. AE → KR: illegal gambling organizers, 2026

On 4 July 2026, Yonhap, citing an interagency team, confirms the return from the UAE through Incheon Airport of two suspects who headed different illegal gambling networks. This was a completed operation, not a promise of extradition.

N16. MY → KR: group of gambling organizers, 2019

On 18 July 2019, Yonhap reports the transfer from Malaysia of 37 South Korean nationals in illegal gambling cases. Many individuals in one episode do not establish sustained current practice.

N17. GB → KR: arrest of a British suspect, 2026

On 9 October 2026, SBS describes the arrest in the United Kingdom of a British national wanted for attempted murder in Seoul. Extradition was still planned. The episode counts as operational assistance, not completed extradition.

N18. VN → US and VN → CN: actual transfers, 2026

On 24 March 2026, VOV reports the transfer of US national Quoc Bao Viet Le at the United States' request on 21 January 2026 and Chinese national Chen Lu to the Chinese side on 18 March 2026. The cases concern murder and arms smuggling respectively; the directions are confirmed separately.

N19. VN → CN: additional transfers, 2025

Vietnamese agency publications confirm the handover of four Chinese fugitives in March 2025 and a separate handover of Xie Yan Na in November 2025. Together with N18, these form a series of distinct completed episodes, but without the denominator of all Chinese requests.

N20. RU ↔ VN: official description of ongoing cooperation

In December 2025, Vietnam's Ministry of Public Security describes coordination already undertaken with Russia to check, locate and arrest individuals. The source supplies no separate verifiable register of completed extraditions. Only a provisional P assessment for both sides is justified by the description of bilateral practice.

N21. FR ↔ VN: police cooperation

On 27 May 2025, VietnamPlus/VNA reports the parties' assessment of results from ongoing crime-fighting cooperation. The publication provides general bilateral confirmation but does not establish a specific transfer of a person or execution of a particular MLA request.

N22. RU → SA: anticorruption case, 2024

The Saudi anticorruption authority and SPA report receiving wanted Saudi national Abdullah bin Awadh Aidah Al-Harthy from Russia in November 2024. The completed transfer is confirmed by the receiving side. The reverse direction is not established.

N23. SA / FR / ES → TR: results for 2017

Anadolu, citing Turkish agency data, reports actual returns in 2017: four people from Saudi Arabia, one from France and three from Spain. The Saudi cases include politically sensitive matters, making generalization to ordinary criminal practice especially limited.

N24. SA → TR: refusal in the Khashoggi case

In April 2022, Turkey's justice minister stated that Saudi Arabia had rejected requests to extradite twenty defendants in the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. Together with N23, this indicates a selective channel, not a general prohibition or general willingness.

N25. MY → SA: Hamza Kashgari, 2012

Malaysian sources confirm Hamza Kashgari's deportation to Saudi Arabia on 12 February 2012 in connection with prosecution over remarks about religion. This older episode is politically and human-rights-sensitive; it is not a basis for predicting ordinary extradition today.

N26. SA ↔ ES: ongoing police contacts

On 26 November 2025, La Moncloa separately notes existing cooperation between Spanish and Saudi security forces alongside new plans. Only confirmation of already operating cooperation is counted; a roadmap and planned exchanges do not themselves earn a score.

N27. DE → US: distinct completed extraditions

DOJ confirms the extradition from Germany of defendant Popan in 2023 and Dominik Rydz in 2025. Distinct completed cases justify an E assessment above a single precedent; they still do not establish the proportion of requests executed.

N28. US ↔ DE: Hydra, 2022

DOJ describes a joint US–German investigation and the shutdown of Hydra infrastructure in April 2022. This independently supports P in both directions; cooperation on Hydra does not establish extradition from the United States to Germany.

N29. FR → US: Christian Marviv Ble, 2026

DOJ reports the extradition from France of Ivorian national Christian Marviv Ble for prosecution in the Eastern District of Texas in April 2026. Receipt of the person is established; generalization is limited to one recent episode.

N30. US → FR: Anatoly Legkodymov, judicial stage

A court decision dated 23 September 2025 concerning France's request confirms judicial authorization of Anatoly Legkodymov's extradition. The document does not establish a completed handover. The score reflects only the confirmed functioning of the procedure.

N31. ES → US: a series in 2023–2024

DOJ confirms extraditions from Spain of Justin O'Connor in 2023, an Egyptian national in a fraud case in January 2024, and a Canadian national in a money-laundering case in 2024. Distinct completed proceedings are established.

N32. US → ES: Inocente Orlando Montano, 2017

DOJ confirms the transfer of the former Salvadoran military officer to Spain on 29 November 2017 in the case concerning the murder of Jesuit priests. This is an older episode involving distinctive aspects of extraterritorial prosecution; current recurrence is unproven.

N33. GB → US: Mehran Koranki

DOJ confirms Mehran Koranki's transfer from the United Kingdom to the United States on 3 June 2024 with his consent. This was a completed episode, not merely a warrant or an arrest; a single case does not provide overall statistics for the channel.

N34. FR → DE / GB: EncroChat material

Publications by Germany's Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights in 2024 confirm the transfer and use of material from the French EncroChat investigation by German and British authorities respectively. The J assessment reflects large-scale evidentiary assistance, not transfers of people; data collection began in 2020, and its consequences were examined later.

N35. DE → FR: execution of measures in a French case, 2024

Eurojust describes action on 21 February 2024 against a migrant-smuggling network: arrests and searches were conducted in Germany in an investigation initiated by French authorities. Executed investigative measures support J; arrests do not establish subsequent handover of those detained.

N36. Germany, France, Spain and British assistance: JuicyFields

Eurojust describes a joint investigation team comprising Germany, France and Spain in the JuicyFields case and practical measures in 2024. Their joint work supports reciprocal P assessments. British assistance at Germany's and Spain's request separately supports GB→DE and GB→ES; reverse directions are not automatically inferred.

N37. GB ↔ FR: joint operation against migrant smuggling, 2026

On 30 March 2026, the NCA reports an operation against a migrant-smuggling network, with arrests in France and the United Kingdom and participation by a bilateral investigative structure. Practical reciprocal police work is counted; a permanent structure does not itself establish extradition or executed MLA.

N38. DE ↔ RS: drug trafficking, 2024

Eurojust reports ten arrests in Germany and Serbia on 4 December 2024, a joint investigation and support for executing mutual legal assistance requests between the parties. Both directions are confirmed by the description of reciprocal cooperation. J is used in the calculation without counting the same operation again under P.

N39. RS ↔ FR: ongoing police exchange

On 27 August 2024, Serbia's government explicitly describes intensive police communication through the Belgrade and Paris Interpol offices. This confirms ongoing exchange but does not provide a list of specific criminal proceedings or completed extraditions.

N40. RS ↔ GB: ongoing cooperation

Serbia's government reports years of Interior Ministry work with the NCA and HMRC; the British side also confirms cooperation, including against people smuggling. The P score is provisional: specific extraditions, request volumes and MLA outcomes are not disclosed.

N41. ES → GB: distinct transfers in 2025

The NCA confirms Craig Bennett's return from Spain in August 2025 and Andrew Doran's in October 2025. Publications about later sentences distinguish completed transfers from initial arrests.

N42. GB → DE: transfer of a suspect

The Police Service of Northern Ireland confirms a man's extradition to Germany on 15 October 2025 to stand trial for sexual offences against a child. The statement explicitly describes a completed transfer, not simply initiation of proceedings.

N43. AE → GB: Stephen Jamieson, 2025

In April 2026, Scotland's prosecution service reports Stephen Jamieson's sentence and his extradition from Dubai in December 2025. This confirms completion of the transfer in a drug case.

N44. AE → FR: a series of extraditions, 2025

On 25 July 2025, Gulf News, citing Dubai Police, reports two new transfers to France and ten extraditions to France since the start of the year. This confirms a series, but not the share of requests granted or the position of UAE citizens.

N45. DE / GB → TR: executed transfers, 2026

In a statement dated 16 March 2026, Turkey's Ministry of Justice reports 19 extraditions from Germany and one from the United Kingdom in the current year. These figures are as of the statement date, not for the full calendar year; individual case facts and all individuals' citizenship are not disclosed.

N46. FR → RU: transfer in a terrorism case, 2025

On 13 August 2025, Russia's Interior Ministry reports France's extradition of a person wanted in a terrorism case. The episode refutes a categorical claim that no transfers occur, but is narrow in subject matter and does not establish willingness in ordinary financial cases.

N47. ES → RU: Feruza Tairova, 2023

Russia's Interior Ministry reports the handover of Russian national Feruza Tairova in Barcelona on 6 July 2023 in a fraud case. An ordinary criminal episode after 2022 is confirmed; this does not mean Spain grants every Russian request.

N48. RU → DE: Waldemar Berger, 2021

Russia's Prosecutor General's Office confirms Waldemar Berger's extradition to Germany on 7 September 2021. The episode falls just outside the five-year window and predates 2022; continuity of the channel is unproven.

N49. DE → RU: substantive refusals, 2023

On 2 August 2023, Vedomosti, citing a response from Russia's Prosecutor General's Office, reports three German extradition refusals justified by risks of ill-treatment. This is evidence of obstacles in specific cases, not a proven absolute prohibition on all forms of cooperation.

N50. ES → CN: selective execution

On 25 May 2025, El País describes an actual handover in a fraud case on 29 October 2024, alongside refusals and unfinished proceedings. Spanish practice cannot be generalized to all of Europe; confirmation of a transfer does not eliminate individual assessment of human-rights risks.

N51. GB ↔ ES and ID → ES: Operation Armourum, 2026

Indonesian police report Steven Lyons's arrest in Bali on 28 March 2026 following a Spanish search. The investigation was conducted jointly by Spain's Guardia Civil and Police Scotland; arrests in both countries are described. This source does not yet establish subsequent handover from Indonesia, so ID→ES receives only P.

N52. US → GB: official historical statistics

A Home Office response to Parliament on 11 November 2014 lists actual extraditions from the United States in 2004–2013, including US nationals. The statistics exclude Scotland. They confirm a historically functioning channel, but not the frequency or effectiveness of execution in 2021–2026.

N53. CN → KR: Lee, 2016

Yonhap, citing South Korea's embassy, confirms the return from China on 8 January 2016 of South Korean national Lee, wanted in an investment-fraud case. A historical episode is confirmed, not a current series.

N54. KR → CN: person wanted for murder, 2026

On 4 August 2026, KBS, citing Gyeonggi Nambu Police, reports the forced return and handover to Chinese investigators of a Chinese national wanted for a 1997 murder. The handover took place at Incheon Airport following a Chinese request; this was removal linked to a criminal search.

G01. Japan → Vietnam: transfer of a sentenced prisoner

Vietnam's Ministry of Public Security describes receiving a sentenced prisoner from Japan in November 2025 to continue serving a sentence. Such a transfer is not treated as extradition of a wanted person for prosecution and does not generate E under this methodology.

G02. China → Vietnam: return after a Chinese sentence

Thanh Hoa Police's report on Bui Van De describes his return after serving a sentence in China and subsequent arrest by Vietnamese authorities. It is insufficiently clear that China handed him over specifically to execute a Vietnamese criminal request; automatic assignment of E is excluded.

G03. Indonesia → France / United Kingdom: excluded returns

Serge Atlaoui's transfer from Indonesia to France in February 2025 concerned a person sentenced in Indonesia. The Indonesian report about the removal of British citizen GLS in August 2025 likewise does not establish a British request concerning a British criminal case. Neither episode automatically counts toward E.

G04. Agreements and plans without established execution

The Japan–Saudi Arabia memorandum, the Vietnam–Spain treaty and Malaysia's negotiations with France confirm a legal or diplomatic framework. This screening did not establish execution of specific requests on these grounds; a treaty alone earns no score.

G05. Vietnam ↔ Germany: extralegal removal is excluded

Germany's Foreign Office statement on Trinh Xuan Thanh in 2017 describes an abduction and a demand for his return so lawful procedures could be considered. This episode is not treated as Germany's execution of legal assistance to Vietnam and does not permit a numerical assessment of ordinary bilateral practice.

G06. Turkey → Saudi Arabia: decision to transfer a case

In April 2022, an Istanbul court decided to transfer proceedings in the Khashoggi case to Saudi Arabia. The judicial decision alone does not establish subsequent actual handover of materials or execution of assistance; J is not assigned without separate confirmation.

G07. ID → ES: why a later headline does not replace confirmation of handover

On 8 April 2026, AP reports Steven Lyons's departure from Indonesia to Amsterdam for onward travel to Spain. The transport stage described does not itself establish receipt of the person by Spanish authorities. ID→ES therefore retains only the reliably confirmed P from N51.

Structural and preservation checks

  • 16 top-level keys, each with 15 recipients: 240 directions without the diagonal.
  • All original 56 JSON values preserve their exact numerical / null meaning.
  • 184 directions added: 68 numerical scores and 116 null values.
  • All new numerical totals recalculated with the stated weights and decimal rounding.
  • Every new numerical total includes components, confidence and at least one item of evidence from the register.
  • Metadata remain in the report; the JSON schema is unchanged: country object → recipient object → number or null.

Archival appendix: original eight-country study

The following is an English translation of the original text, with its substantive content preserved. It concerns only the previous 56 directions. Its local matrix and totals do not replace the expanded matrix above. Reauditing the original scores was outside the scope of this supplement.

Practical law enforcement cooperation: eight countries

Research cutoff and source access date: 15 October 2026. A → B means that A provides a person, information or assistance to the authorities of B. Charges in the register describe the underlying proceedings, not guilt established by this study.

Summary findings

All 56 directions were examined: 44 received numerical scores and 12 received null. The figures characterize observed practical assistance within the established components. They are not extradition probabilities and cannot rank an individual's safety.

The strongest recent series of transfers of people in this sample were found in RS→RU, TR→RU, ID→CN and MY→ID. US→MY stands out for repeated returns of 1MDB assets. Scores of 9–10 are deliberately absent: public material does not establish cooperation that is so broad and consistent. Extraditions within politically contentious relationships, particularly US↔CN, show why practice cannot be inferred from political rhetoric.

Asymmetries have different meanings. The difference between US→RU and RU→US concerns not only willingness but different observed channels: the former assesses E/J, the latter only P. RS→RU has a recent extradition series; RU→RS has one older completed case. ID→RU is confirmed by both a transfer and executed MLA; RU→ID remains unknown. Reverse null values do not establish lower willingness: they often reflect asymmetry in public data. Equal figures, such as AE→US and US→AE, likewise do not imply identical component coverage.

The assessments of TR→CN, MY→TR, TR→MY and TR→ID are particularly limited: the evidence found is dominated by politically sensitive or counterterrorism cases. They are retained as provisional numerical scores under the requested rule that one substantive precedent is sufficient; generalization to ordinary fraud is weak. These four directions should be separated out in comparisons of ordinary criminal extradition alone.

Results matrix

Rows represent providing state A; columns represent recipient B. “—” means an excluded self-relationship.

A → B US RU CN AE RS MY ID TR
US — 3.4 6.0 6.0 5.0 6.6 5.0 5.0
RU 3.0 — 6.0 5.5 5.5 null null 6.0
CN 6.0 6.0 — 5.0 null 6.0 6.0 null
AE 6.0 6.0 6.5 — 6.0 null null null
RS 6.0 7.0 6.0 6.0 — null 6.0 5.0
MY 6.5 5.0 5.5 null null — 7.0 5.0
ID 5.5 5.7 7.0 null 5.5 5.5 — null
TR 6.0 7.0 4.0 6.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 —

Original methodology

Main five-year interval: 15 October 2021–15 October 2026. Older cases are retained where they demonstrate a channel that operated in practice and no termination was found; absence of a discovered termination does not itself prove continuity. A recent fact carries more weight than an older series. Source age is considered when assessing continuity and separately in confidence, without a mechanical annual penalty.

The user's scale is applied as an expert comparative scale: 1 — near-total breakdown; 2 — extremely low level; 3 — severely restricted individual channels; 4 — selective cooperation; 5 — functioning but uneven; 6 — confirmed appreciable practical assistance; 7 — repeated, sustained practice; 8 — highly developed cooperation; 9 — intensive, broad cooperation; 10 — the closest confirmed cooperation. Half-points are used for borderline cases but do not imply statistical precision.

Component What is counted Base weight
E Actual transfer of a wanted person, including confirmed deportation in B's interests; separately, a substantive refusal or demonstrated functioning of a procedure 0.60
J Execution of legal assistance and provision of evidence through legal procedures; return of criminal assets with a qualification about this segment 0.25
P Practical police exchange, operational assistance and joint investigation 0.15
score = round(sum(weight_i * score_i) / sum(weight_i), 1)

The sum includes known components only. Unknown values are shown as “?” in tables and receive neither 0 nor 5. With only E known, the final score equals E; with only P known, it equals P, but does not become evidence of extraditions. Calculations use decimal arithmetic, rounded to one decimal place, half up. Examples: US→RU: (0.60×4 + 0.25×2)/0.85 = 3.4; US→MY: (0.60×6 + 0.25×8)/0.85 = 6.6.

A treaty without practice earns no score. An arrest is not extradition; judicial authorization is not handover; absence of a public outcome is not a refusal. Interpol participation and joint tourist patrols are insufficient by themselves. An official description of ongoing criminal cooperation may support a provisional P; promotional language is not transferred onto the scale. One fact is not automatically duplicated across all three components: for example, the operational material in C04 counts under P, not additionally under J.

Deportation counts only where a connection to the recipient's criminal search or proceedings is established; ordinary removal for visa violations is excluded. For the counterterrorism returns in C43–C44, the connection to receiving law enforcement agencies is established, but formal individual requests are not reconstructed. Political-prisoner exchanges are excluded as indicators of ordinary criminal extradition.

Confidence concerns the generalized assessment of a direction, not only the reliability of one event. High confidence requires independent, current and sufficiently broad evidence; medium requires reliable execution and a clear mechanism despite coverage gaps; low reflects a single old, indirectly confirmed or narrowly focused basis. No generalization in this sample received high confidence: even persuasive official releases usually provide no denominator of requests. For null, low confidence means uncertainty about actual practice, not proof of absent cooperation.

US — United States. Extradition from the United States normally requires an applicable treaty; the Justice Manual describes narrow statutory exceptions and separately discusses alternative return methods. There is no basis for treating US citizenship as a general absolute prohibition. The specific treaty's conditions, judicial stage and final decision must be checked. Immigration removal does not create an extradition treaty. Sources: L01: DOJ Justice Manual, 9-15: International Extradition.

RU — Russia. Article 61 of the Constitution prohibits extradition of Russian citizens; it does not prohibit extradition of foreigners. Asylum and political persecution create separate limitations. The Justice Ministry's official list confirms treaty channels with China, Serbia, Turkey, the United States (MLA) and Indonesia; their existence does not substitute for execution. Sources: L02: Russia's Ministry of Justice: list of international treaties; L03: Prosecution service: restrictions on extradition from Russia.

CN — China. China's extradition law provides for refusal to extradite its own citizens and separate protection grounds, including political persecution. Mainland China and Hong Kong have different extradition regimes. Transfer of a foreigner, police assistance and return of a Chinese citizen to China are different legal situations. Sources: L04: Extradition Law of the People's Republic of China.

AE — United Arab Emirates. UAE federal legislation on international criminal cooperation and individual treaties form the legal framework. The episodes studied include both extradition and deportation. No case confirming transfer of a UAE citizen was established; evidence about transfers of foreigners does not extend to that category. Access to the law's text was limited, so a comprehensive current version of the restrictions is not reconstructed here. Sources: L05: UAE: Federal Law No. 39 of 2006, international legal assistance; L11: UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs: list of international agreements.

RS — Serbia. Serbian law sets extradition conditions, including a citizenship criterion, subject to the priority of an applicable international treaty. C08 shows a Serbian citizen's transfer to the United States with his consent under a treaty mechanism. An absolute prohibition for every partner therefore cannot be mechanically asserted. Political exceptions are checked separately. Sources: L06: UNODC SHERLOC: Serbia's Law on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Articles 13–40; L10: US State Department: entry into force of the US–Serbia extradition treaty.

MY — Malaysia. The Extradition Act 1992 provides restrictions, including the political nature of a request and procedural conditions. C10 demonstrates transfer of an own national with consent; C11 concerns a third-country national. Neither the law's existence nor this single citizenship example guarantees transfer to any partner. Sources: L07: UNODC SHERLOC: Malaysia Extradition Act 1992, sections 8–10.

ID — Indonesia. Law No. 1/1979 permits a treaty route and, under certain conditions, cooperation based on good relations and national interests. Article 7 provides the possibility of refusing to extradite an own citizen, not unconditional impossibility of any assistance. Deportation of a foreigner and MLA are assessed separately. Sources: L08: ASEAN: Summary of Indonesian Extradition Act No. 1/1979.

TR — Turkey. Law No. 6706 restricts extradition of Turkish citizens and provides exceptions relating to international criminal justice; political character and treatment risks also matter. Transfers of foreigners neither bypass nor disprove the citizenship rule. Signing a treaty with China or the UAE does not itself establish entry into force. Sources: L09: ECtHR: text of restrictions under Turkish Law No. 6706; L13: TBMM: committee report on the Turkey–UAE treaty; L14: TBMM: Turkey–China treaty bill.

Restrictions relating to asylum, political persecution, torture, the death penalty and dual criminality are examined in each specific procedure. Where sources do not publish conditions or diplomatic assurances, these are marked unknown rather than assumed to have been obtained. Citizenship is not inferred from a surname, ethnicity or the country bringing charges. The legal notes above apply to all seven outgoing directions for the relevant country; they are not independent evidence of practice.

Original case register

Each entry separates the outcome from the general conclusion. If individual transfer conditions or reasons for refusal are not given, the sources used do not disclose them. Unknown information has not been filled in with assumptions.

C01. Unnamed Russian fugitive

Direction: US→RU. Citizenship: Russia. Dates: 3 December 2020.

Category: Attempted murder in Russia; separate US fraud. Mechanism: ICE immigration removal.

Request and outcome: ICE reported the completed return of a wanted person to Russia.

What it establishes and its limits: Confirms an alternative transfer, not extradition. An older case does not automatically describe practice after 2022.

Sources: S01: ICE: weekly bulletin, return of a Russian fugitive.

C02. Russian requests concerning IT crimes

Direction: US→RU. Citizenship: Not applicable. Dates: Requests in 2023; statement on 7 February 2024.

Category: IT crimes. Mechanism: Mutual legal assistance.

Request and outcome: According to the Russian side, of 26 requests, three were rejected and 23 remained unanswered; none was executed.

What it establishes and its limits: These are one side's figures for a particular category; no response differs from refusal, and the figures cannot be generalized to all requests.

Sources: S02: Interfax: 26 Russian IT-crime requests to the United States.

C03. REvil

Direction: RU→US. Citizenship: The citizenship of individual detainees was not established in the materials used. Dates: 14 January 2022; subsequent termination of working dialogue in 2022.

Category: Ransomware. Mechanism: Police assistance, searches and arrests in Russia.

Request and outcome: Russian authorities stated that they acted on US information. Later reports describe the bilateral working group's suspension.

What it establishes and its limits: Demonstrates executed operational assistance, not extradition or sustained current transfer of judicial evidence.

Sources: S03: Reuters / Euronews: REvil arrests at the United States' request; S04: CyberScoop: termination of working cooperation on REvil.

C04. Liu (刘某文), full name undisclosed

Direction: US→CN; CN→US. Citizenship: Not specified. Dates: Arrest in the United States in October 2024; transfer to China on 20 July 2026.

Category: Kidnapping and murder of Chinese nationals in the Philippines. Mechanism: Deportation from the United States; exchange of operational information and evidence.

Request and outcome: An official Chinese source reports a US arrest based on Chinese material and delivery to Beijing.

What it establishes and its limits: For US→CN, establishes actual transfer; for CN→US, provision of specific material. No formal MLA procedure is named, so the exchange counts under P and is not duplicated under J.

Sources: S05: China's Ministry of Justice: Liu's return from the United States.

C05. Unnamed person wanted by the United States

Direction: CN→US. Citizenship: Not established; the expression “US fugitive” is not equated with citizenship. Dates: 23 July 2026.

Category: Violent crimes. Mechanism: Handover to US representatives at Shanghai airport.

Request and outcome: An official Chinese source reports a completed handover into US escort custody.

What it establishes and its limits: Does not establish a bilateral extradition treaty or extradition of Chinese nationals.

Sources: S06: SCIO: handover of a person wanted by the United States.

C06. Joint operation against scam centres

Direction: AE→US; US→AE; CN→US; CN→AE. Citizenship: Various nationalities; these do not determine the institutional assessment. Dates: DOJ statement on 29 April 2026.

Category: Online fraud and money laundering. Mechanism: Joint investigation by the FBI, Dubai Police and Chinese authorities.

Request and outcome: DOJ reported 275 arrests in Dubai and one more in Thailand, parallel investigations and coordination.

What it establishes and its limits: Participation supports P. Extradition of those arrested to the United States was not established. CN→AE is assessed more cautiously: participation in the overall operation is established, but the content of a separate bilateral request is unpublished.

Sources: S07: DOJ: joint operation against scam centres.

C07. Working FBI–Serbian Interior Ministry channel

Direction: US→RS. Citizenship: Not applicable. Dates: October–November 2014.

Category: Cybercrime. Mechanism: Information exchange and an FBI representative working in Belgrade.

Request and outcome: Serbia's government described a specialist already working there and information exchange.

What it establishes and its limits: The confirmation is old; it is not statistics on current executed MLA or extraditions.

Sources: S08: Government of Serbia: Interior Ministry and FBI cooperation.

C08. Antonije Stojilkovic

Direction: RS→US. Citizenship: Serbia. Dates: Arrest on 24 July 2020; transfer on 4 February 2021.

Category: Investment fraud of approximately USD 70 million. Mechanism: Extradition with the defendant's consent.

Request and outcome: DOJ confirmed his arrival in the United States.

What it establishes and its limits: Shows that an own national can be transferred under an applicable treaty procedure; the defendant's consent limits generalization.

Sources: S09: DOJ: Antonije Stojilkovic's extradition in a fraud case.

C09. Cui and Miller

Direction: RS→US. Citizenship: China and the United Kingdom respectively. Dates: 2025.

Category: Commissioned interstate stalking and harassment. Mechanism: Arrests in Serbia in connection with a US case.

Request and outcome: DOJ confirmed the arrests; this material does not confirm eventual extradition.

What it establishes and its limits: Only P is counted. The politically sensitive context is separated from the ordinary criminal basis in C08.

Sources: S10: DOJ: arrest of two foreign nationals in Serbia in a US stalking case.

C10. Roger Ng

Direction: MY→US; US→MY. Citizenship: Malaysia. Dates: Transferred to the United States on 6 May 2019; returned on 8 October 2023.

Category: Corruption, 1MDB, money laundering. Mechanism: Initially extradition with consent; subsequently temporary return for Malaysian proceedings.

Request and outcome: Both actual transfers are confirmed; the return was subject to agreed procedural conditions.

What it establishes and its limits: These are two directional actions, not automatic symmetry. The return does not mean the US conviction was overturned.

Sources: S11: DOJ: Roger Ng's extradition from Malaysia; S13: Scoop: police confirm Roger Ng's arrival in Malaysia.

C11. Louay Ibrahim Hussein

Direction: MY→US. Citizenship: Lebanon. Dates: 21 July 2016.

Category: Production and circulation of counterfeit currency. Mechanism: Extradition.

Request and outcome: DOJ reported completed extradition from Malaysia.

What it establishes and its limits: Confirms extradition of a third-country national; the case is old but supplements C10.

Sources: S12: DOJ: Louay Ibrahim Hussein's extradition.

C12. Return of 1MDB assets

Direction: US→MY. Citizenship: Not applicable. Dates: A series of returns; statement on 13 June 2024.

Category: Embezzlement and money laundering. Mechanism: Judicial recovery and repatriation of assets.

Request and outcome: DOJ reported an additional USD 156 million returned and approximately USD 1.4 billion in total.

What it establishes and its limits: Effective legal assistance across a major group of cases. Does not establish equally broad exchange of every type of evidence.

Sources: S14: DOJ: a total of USD 1.4 billion returned to Malaysia in the 1MDB case.

C13. Richard Macadangdang Sales

Direction: ID→US. Citizenship: Not specified in the release used. Dates: Deportation on 11 January 2018; US court appearance on 12 January 2018.

Category: Investment fraud and money laundering. Mechanism: Deportation, FBI escort and arrest on arrival in the United States.

Request and outcome: The FBI explicitly describes work with Indonesian police and immigration authorities and a completed return.

What it establishes and its limits: Not extradition. Its age reduces confidence in the assessment as of 2026.

Sources: S15: FBI: Richard Macadangdang Sales returned from Indonesia.

C14. David Nusa Wijaya / Thuen Wie Ng

Direction: US→ID. Citizenship: Indonesian origin; current citizenship is not confirmed by this release. Dates: Request on 11 January 2006; arrest in Jakarta after return on 17 January 2006.

Category: Embezzlement of bank funds. Mechanism: DSS/FBI assistance with return; a US visa-fraud case.

Request and outcome: The State Department archive links the return to an official Indonesian request.

What it establishes and its limits: A very old precedent; not described as formal extradition. The page contains an internal typo, “2005”, in the release line; the chronology and headline date refer to 2006.

Sources: S16: US State Department: David Nusa Wijaya's return.

C15. Eylem Tok and Timur Cihantimur

Direction: US→TR. Citizenship: Turkish nationality; second citizenship and its procedural effect are not established here. Dates: Judicial authorization on 11 February 2025; follow-up report on 5 May 2026.

Category: Fatal traffic collision and assistance in flight. Mechanism: Extradition proceedings.

Request and outcome: A US court found extradition admissible; the later material does not confirm delivery to Turkey.

What it establishes and its limits: Demonstrates a functioning judicial stage, not an executed request; E is limited to 5.

Sources: S17: Reuters: court authorizes extradition of Eylem Tok and Timur Cihantimur; S18: Turkish Minute: Tok and Cihantimur case remains at the handover-decision stage.

C16. Ibrahim Khaldoon Hilmi

Direction: TR→US. Citizenship: Not established. Dates: Report on 23 June 2026.

Category: Medicare fraud. Mechanism: Actual transfer into US custody; described as extradition by the media.

Request and outcome: Hürriyet, citing US officials, reports his arrival in Miami.

What it establishes and its limits: The outcome is confirmed through media reporting of official statements; the legal transfer instrument was not found, and the precise mechanism is not reconstructed.

Sources: S19: Hürriyet Daily News: Ibrahim Khaldoon Hilmi delivered to the United States.

C17. Ramon Abbas / Hushpuppi

Direction: AE→US. Citizenship: Nigeria. Dates: Expulsion in June 2020; US sentencing on 7 November 2022.

Category: Laundering proceeds of cyberfraud. Mechanism: Expulsion.

Request and outcome: DOJ describes actual expulsion from the UAE and subsequent US proceedings.

What it establishes and its limits: Not evidence of formal extradition; third-country citizenship matters. Recent C06 confirms that the operational channel remains active.

Sources: S20: DOJ: sentencing of Ramon Abbas / Hushpuppi, previously expelled from the UAE.

C18. Xu Wenbin

Direction: RU→CN. Citizenship: China. Dates: Arrest in Russia in December 2021; transfer on 3 March 2023.

Category: Murder of a police officer in 1996. Mechanism: Extradition.

Request and outcome: Russia's Interior Ministry reported completed extradition to the Chinese side.

What it establishes and its limits: An ordinary violent criminal case; does not establish extradition of Russian nationals or the absence of assurance requirements in other cases.

Sources: S21: Russian Interior Ministry: Xu Wenbin extradited to China.

C19. Unnamed bribery intermediary

Direction: CN→RU. Citizenship: Russia. Dates: Request in 2024; handover in Guangzhou on 20 March 2026.

Category: Intermediation in bribery, events in 2020–2023. Mechanism: Extradition.

Request and outcome: Russia's Interior Ministry confirmed handover to a Russian escort.

What it establishes and its limits: Confirms functioning extradition in a corruption case, not extradition of China's own citizens.

Sources: S22: Russian Interior Ministry: defendant accused of bribery intermediation extradited from China.

C20. Yesbolat Kenzhegazy and Anorbek Tyumibayev

Direction: RU→AE. Citizenship: Kazakhstan, according to a media report. Dates: Arrest in Russia in January 2025; transfer reported on 13 December 2025.

Category: Assault and robbery of Edvard Sabirov in the UAE. Mechanism: Actual transfer according to regional media; precise procedure not established.

Request and outcome: BUSINESS Online reports that the Russian side handed the individuals over to the UAE.

What it establishes and its limits: Provisional confirmation from media citing unnamed sources. A legally formalized “exchange” for Sabirov is unproven; this material does not establish their extradition by Turkey.

Sources: S23: BUSINESS Online: Russia's handover of individuals involved in the attack on Sabirov.

C21. Edvard Sabirov

Direction: AE→RU. Citizenship: Russia; reports of other passports are not treated as established facts. Dates: 10 December 2025.

Category: Finiko: Ponzi scheme, fraud and a criminal organization. Mechanism: Deportation with handover to Russian officers.

Request and outcome: RBC, citing the Interior Ministry, reported an actual handover in Dubai.

What it establishes and its limits: Practical assistance is confirmed, but “extradition” is inaccurate terminology. Does not establish regular extradition of everyone accused of financial crimes.

Sources: S24: RBC: Edvard Sabirov deported from the UAE.

C22. Slaviša Karabašević

Direction: RU→RS. Citizenship: Serbia. Dates: Decision in 2020; completed return confirmed on 2 March 2021.

Category: Murder in 2002. Mechanism: Extradition to enforce a sentence.

Request and outcome: Serbian media report his admission to Zabela prison after transfer from Russia.

What it establishes and its limits: The outcome is not replaced by the 2020 authorization alone; the precedent slightly predates the main five-year window.

Sources: S25: Telegraf: Slaviša Karabašević admitted to a Serbian prison after transfer from Russia.

C23. Ara Bagdasaryan and a separate unnamed fugitive

Direction: RS→RU. Citizenship: Russia, both according to Interior Ministry reports. Dates: 30 January 2025 and 28 August 2026.

Category: Organizing illegal migration; drugs in the second case. Mechanism: Extraditions.

Request and outcome: The Interior Ministry reports two completed transfers from Serbia.

What it establishes and its limits: Two different cases support recurrence; they do not show the number of refusals or practice concerning Serbian citizens.

Sources: S26: Russian Interior Ministry: Ara Bagdasaryan extradited from Serbia; S27: Russian Interior Ministry: extradition from Serbia of a person wanted in a drug case.

C24. Levent Aslan Paksoy

Direction: RU→TR. Citizenship: Turkey. Dates: 5 July 2024.

Category: Fraud involving approximately EUR 500,000. Mechanism: Extradition.

Request and outcome: Handover to a Turkish escort at Vnukovo was reported.

What it establishes and its limits: Specific execution in an ordinary criminal case; not a basis for generalizing to Turkish political requests.

Sources: S28: Vedomosti: Russia hands Levent Aslan Paksoy over to Turkey.

C25. Real-estate cases and Finiko (Madiyarova)

Direction: TR→RU. Citizenship: Russian fugitives; all possible additional citizenships have not been established. Dates: 23 July 2025; April 2026.

Category: Real-estate fraud; Ponzi scheme. Mechanism: Deportation / transfer; the procedure's name varies by report.

Request and outcome: RBC and Interfax report two completed returns to Russia.

What it establishes and its limits: Sustained practical assistance in financial cases is not equivalent to a universal extradition mechanism.

Sources: S29: RBC: deportation from Turkey of a defendant accused of real-estate fraud; S30: Interfax: Madiyarova transferred from Turkey in the Finiko case.

C26. Unnamed Nizhny Novgorod entrepreneur

Direction: MY→RU. Citizenship: Not explicitly specified in the quotation used. Dates: 18 March 2018.

Category: Approximately 60 episodes of loan fraud. Mechanism: Deportation.

Request and outcome: The Interior Ministry quotation explicitly states that the person was deported to Russia with a Russian escort.

What it establishes and its limits: The headline and introduction use “extradited”, but the mechanism is classified according to the ministry's direct explanation. The case is old.

Sources: S31: Business FM / Interior Ministry: deportation of a Nizhny Novgorod entrepreneur from Malaysia.

C27. Andrey Kovalenko / Andrey Ayer

Direction: ID→RU. Citizenship: Russia. Dates: Request in February 2021; delivered on 24 March 2021.

Category: Drug trafficking and smuggling. Mechanism: Deportation after an Indonesian sentence.

Request and outcome: On 24 March, the Interior Ministry confirmed delivery to Moscow; the prosecutor's release on 23 March still described a future journey.

What it establishes and its limits: The final stage was checked against a separate source; it is not attributed to the 2023 extradition treaty.

Sources: S32: Russian Interior Ministry: Andrey Kovalenko delivered from Indonesia.

C28. Seven Russian MLA requests to Indonesia

Direction: ID→RU. Citizenship: Not applicable. Dates: Status as of 24 June 2026.

Category: Individual case categories undisclosed. Mechanism: Treaty-based legal assistance.

Request and outcome: According to Indonesia's minister: one executed, three awaiting document verification by Russia, one rejected and two withdrawn by Russia.

What it establishes and its limits: No 1/7 “willingness rate” is calculated: reasons and statuses differ. This directly demonstrates functioning J only in ID→RU.

Sources: S33: ANTARA: execution of Russian legal assistance requests.

C29. KT; ZR, LZ and HZ; separate XP case

Direction: CN→ID; ID→CN. Citizenship: KT: Indonesia; ZR, LZ, HZ and XP: China. Dates: July 2026; separate XP deportation in July 2025.

Category: Fraud and financial crimes. Mechanism: Reciprocal handovers; deportation for XP.

Request and outcome: Polri describes KT's extradition from China and Indonesia's handover of three Chinese fugitives; it separately confirms XP's deportation.

What it establishes and its limits: Both directions are established through separate actions. The 2026 package is not treated as three independent years of sustained practice.

Sources: S34: Polri: reciprocal handover of fugitives between Indonesia and China; S35: Polri: deportation of Chinese fugitive XP.

C30. MBI / Tedy Teow Wooi Huat

Direction: CN→MY; MY→CN. Citizenship: Teow: Malaysia. Dates: 2025.

Category: Ponzi scheme and money laundering. Mechanism: Joint police investigation.

Request and outcome: CNA, citing the minister: China supplied interrogation data; Malaysia used them for arrests and financial measures in a joint operation.

What it establishes and its limits: P is confirmed, E is not assessed: Thailand, not Malaysia, extradited Teow to China. Malaysia's reciprocal contribution is action in a joint case, not proven delivery of a complete judicial dossier.

Sources: S36: CNA: joint investigation of the MBI Ponzi scheme.

C31. Kan and an unnamed operator of scam websites

Direction: AE→CN. Citizenship: Citizenship is not established with the required precision in the materials used. Dates: March 2017; 14 August 2025.

Category: Fraud; illegal gambling and scam websites. Mechanism: Extraditions.

Request and outcome: Chinese and Emirati media report completed transfers several years apart.

What it establishes and its limits: Recurrence exists, but the statistics are insufficient for 8–10. Practice concerning extradition of UAE citizens is not established.

Sources: S37: Gulf News: handover to China of a scam-website operator; S38: The Paper: Kan's extradition from the UAE to China.

C32. Fan Jiping / 范继萍

Direction: RS→CN. Citizenship: Not explicitly stated in the report used. Dates: Arrest in October 2020; request in November 2020; extradition on 1 December 2021.

Category: Laundering proceeds of corruption. Mechanism: Extradition.

Request and outcome: An official Chinese report sequentially describes the request, arrest and return.

What it establishes and its limits: An ordinary criminal corruption case. It predates China's ratification of the new treaty in 2025 and does not establish when that treaty entered into force.

Sources: S39: China's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection: Fan Jiping's extradition from Serbia.

C33. Abudukadir Yapuquan

Direction: TR→CN. Citizenship: Uyghur origin; precise citizenship at the decision date is not established here. Dates: April 2021.

Category: Chinese terrorism accusation; politically sensitive case. Mechanism: Judicial refusal of extradition.

Request and outcome: SCMP reports that a Turkish court found the evidence provided insufficient.

What it establishes and its limits: A substantive refusal supports only a narrow provisional E assessment. It does not establish systematic refusal in fraud or violence cases outside a political context.

Sources: S40: SCMP: Turkish court refuses to extradite Abudukadir Yapuquan.

C34. Operation Haris / Marko Đorđević

Direction: AE→RS; RS→AE. Citizenship: Not established by the selected report. Dates: Murder on 16 October 2025; report on 7 December 2025.

Category: Murder and organized crime. Mechanism: Police intelligence exchange and arrest in Dubai.

Request and outcome: Serbia identified the suspect; the UAE arrested him. The official account describes joint work.

What it establishes and its limits: There are directional contributions to P by both sides. Actual extradition to Serbia is unconfirmed; E remains unknown.

Sources: S41: WAM / Sharjah24: Operation Haris, UAE–Serbia cooperation.

C35. Suspects in the murder of Zvi Kogan

Direction: TR→AE. Citizenship: Uzbekistan; three individuals. Dates: November 2024.

Category: Murder. Mechanism: Arrest in Turkey and handover to the UAE.

Request and outcome: Reuters reports executed assistance and transfer of the suspects.

What it establishes and its limits: A specific violent crime; its religious and political resonance is not converted into evidence of general extradition of political opponents.

Sources: S42: Reuters: Turkey's assistance in arresting suspects in Zvi Kogan's murder.

C36. Maria Pauline Lumowa

Direction: RS→ID. Citizenship: Netherlands. Dates: Delivered to Jakarta on 9 July 2020.

Category: Bank fraud in 2003. Mechanism: Extradition.

Request and outcome: The Jakarta Post confirms actual arrival following Serbian proceedings.

What it establishes and its limits: An important case involving a third-country national; its age limits confidence in current coverage.

Sources: S43: Jakarta Post: Maria Pauline Lumowa arrives from Serbia.

C37. Nikolov Iliev

Direction: ID→RS. Citizenship: Serbia. Dates: Transfer in 2015; official retrospective report on 9 July 2020.

Category: Theft of banking data. Mechanism: Extradition according to Indonesia's official account.

Request and outcome: Indonesia's minister cited the completed transfer to Serbia as an example of reciprocity.

What it establishes and its limits: An old but specific precedent; not automatically inferred from C36.

Sources: S44: ANTARA: Nikolov Iliev's transfer to Serbia in 2015.

C38. Serbian extraditions to Turkey; Ecevit Piroğlu

Direction: RS→TR. Citizenship: Undisclosed for the aggregate; Piroğlu: Turkey. Dates: Five extraditions in 2016–2021; court refusal in Piroğlu's case in 2023, continued detention described in 2024.

Category: Mixed set of cases; Piroğlu is a politically sensitive case. Mechanism: Aggregate extraditions; a separate judicial refusal.

Request and outcome: RFE/RL cites five extraditions from 16 requests; Amnesty describes the court's refusal to extradite Piroğlu.

What it establishes and its limits: The aggregate lacks an offence breakdown. Not all unexecuted requests are described as refusals; the political case does not cancel out completed transfers.

Sources: S45: Radio Slobodna Evropa: Turkish requests and extraditions from Serbia; S46: Amnesty: Ecevit Piroğlu's detention and risk of extradition.

C39. Ongoing police work between Serbia and Turkey

Direction: TR→RS; RS→TR. Citizenship: Not applicable. Dates: 20 May 2025.

Category: Organized crime and illegal migration; separately, terrorism. Mechanism: Joint border patrols and an ongoing police channel.

Request and outcome: Serbia's government describes cooperation already being carried out, not simply an intention to sign a document.

What it establishes and its limits: Supports provisional P=5; no volume of information requests is provided, so the diplomatic description “very high” is not transferred onto the scale.

Sources: S47: Government of Serbia: ongoing police cooperation between Serbia and Turkey.

C40. Djoko Tjandra; separate MKA case

Direction: MY→ID. Citizenship: Tjandra: Papua New Guinea; MKA's citizenship is not established by the brief report. Dates: 30 July 2020; MKA returned on 11 October 2026, expulsion order dated 7 October 2026.

Category: Tjandra: banking corruption; MKA: suspected murder. Mechanism: Police return of Tjandra; expulsion of MKA.

Request and outcome: Bernama confirms Tjandra's return; Polri confirms MKA's return from Malaysia.

What it establishes and its limits: Two different periods and offence types support recurrence. Tjandra's citizenship was checked separately; he is not automatically recorded as Indonesian.

Sources: S48: Bernama: Djoko Tjandra's return from Malaysia; S49: ABC: Djoko Tjandra's Papua New Guinean citizenship; S50: Polri: suspect MKA's return from Malaysia.

C41. Jamal Yunos

Direction: ID→MY. Citizenship: Malaysia. Dates: 5 July 2018.

Category: Flight from proceedings concerning public-order offences. Mechanism: Deportation.

Request and outcome: Appeared in a Malaysian court after returning from Indonesia.

What it establishes and its limits: A public and political figure, but the grounds for return were procedural; this is not an example of extradition for a financial crime.

Sources: S51: Free Malaysia Today: Jamal Yunos appears in court after deportation.

C42. Turgay Karaman, Ihsan Aslan, Ismet Ozcelik

Direction: MY→TR. Citizenship: Turkey. Dates: 11 May 2017.

Category: Allegations of links to the Gülen movement. Mechanism: Deportation / handover.

Request and outcome: Anadolu, citing Malaysian police, reports the completed handover of all three.

What it establishes and its limits: A politically sensitive case; confirms the practical possibility of transfer but leaves regularity in ordinary criminal cases unknown.

Sources: S52: Anadolu: Malaysia hands three suspects over to Turkey.

C43. Unnamed former FGVH employee

Direction: TR→MY. Citizenship: Malaysia. Dates: Arrested in Turkey on 25 October 2015; deportation confirmed on 16 November 2015.

Category: Suspected intention to join IS. Mechanism: Deportation.

Request and outcome: Malaysian police reported a completed return from Turkey.

What it establishes and its limits: Not confused with the 22-year-old canteen worker in the same report: this is a different, third individual. An old counterterrorism case with narrow applicability.

Sources: S53: Malay Mail: deportation from Turkey of a suspected IS associate.

C44. Group of 14 Indonesians

Direction: TR→ID. Citizenship: Indonesia. Dates: Report on 27 February 2025.

Category: Suspected terrorism links. Mechanism: Deportation and subsequent BNPT screening.

Request and outcome: The Indonesian agency reports actual returns from Turkey.

What it establishes and its limits: No evidence of 14 granted extradition requests or convictions; ordinary criminal coverage is not established.

Sources: S54: ANTARA / BNPT: 14 Indonesians deported from Turkey.

C45. Edward Snowden

Direction: HK→US and RU→US; HK is not included in CN's matrix. Citizenship: United States in 2013; Russian citizenship granted in 2022. Dates: Departure from Hong Kong on 23 June 2013; Russian citizenship on 26 September 2022.

Category: State secrets and related charges; political context. Mechanism: US request for provisional arrest; subsequently Russian asylum.

Request and outcome: No transfer to the United States took place. Hong Kong officially cited insufficient documentation and no lawful basis to prevent departure.

What it establishes and its limits: This marks a limit to political cooperation, not an ordinary criminal score for CN→US; Snowden cannot be assigned Russian citizenship as of 2013.

Sources: S55: Government of Hong Kong: Edward Snowden's departure; S56: Forbes: Snowden granted Russian citizenship.

C46. Erik Gafarov / Gafarov & Partners

Direction: Presumably NL→RU, outside the matrix. Citizenship: Russian origin; current citizenships not verified. Dates: Reports on 16 April 2025, 26 August 2026 and 14 October 2026.

Category: Ponzi scheme and fraud. Mechanism: International search; a formal Dutch extradition procedure was not established.

Request and outcome: The search is confirmed by reports citing the Interior Ministry. The Netherlands is named in media, but an official request, a decision on it and current whereabouts are not established by a primary document.

What it establishes and its limits: Location and asylum status remain media-reported information. There is no proven Dutch refusal; the direction is outside the eight-country set.

Sources: S58: 116.ru: Tatarstan Interior Ministry on the search for Erik Gafarov; S59: 116.ru: international search for Gafarov resumed; S60: Chelny Live: reports of Erik Gafarov's presence in the Netherlands.

C47. Zhanbolat Serikov

Direction: AZ→AE, outside the matrix. Citizenship: Kazakhstan. Dates: Report on 28 July 2025.

Category: Organizing an attack, kidnapping and violence in the UAE. Mechanism: Extradition following a court decision.

Request and outcome: Orda, citing AzerTac, reports completed transfer from Azerbaijan.

What it establishes and its limits: Clarifies the original lead: this is not Turkey. It is not used as evidence for TR→AE.

Sources: S57: Orda: Zhanbolat Serikov transferred to the UAE from Azerbaijan.

Analysis of all 56 original directions

“?” means a component was not assessed. General citizenship and political limitations are set out above; each entry notes which are actually tested by the precedent. For null, the sum of known weights is zero.

US — United States provides assistance

US → RU: 3.4

Components: E=4.0, J=2.0, P=?. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. A transfer through immigration procedures is documented, but the latest case used predates the sharp deterioration in relations. For J, there is a specific report that an entire group of requests went unexecuted. E=4 therefore reflects a remaining selective possibility; J=2 reflects an observed blockage in this segment, not a complete prohibition.

Evidence base: C01 C02. Direct sources: S01: ICE: weekly bulletin, return of a Russian fugitive; S02: Interfax: 26 Russian IT-crime requests to the United States.

Law, citizenship and limitations. The 1999 legal assistance treaty is in force (since 2002), but a treaty does not eliminate practical difficulties. There is no general extradition treaty; US exceptions and immigration transfers are distinct.

Gaps. No comparable US response on the fate of all 26 requests was found; overall MLA statistics are unknown.

Reverse direction: RU→US = 3.0; E=?, J=?, P=3.0. The difference follows from the independent precedents and component composition described above, not a mirrored score.

US → CN: 6.0

Components: E=6.0, J=?, P=?. Confidence: medium.

Facts and analytical conclusion. A suspect in a serious ordinary criminal case was transferred in 2026 following an exchange of material. This directly demonstrates a functioning E channel despite political differences. The report does not establish a separate outgoing information response from the United States to China.

Evidence base: C04. Direct sources: S05: China's Ministry of Justice: Liu's return from the United States.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Ordinary treaty extradition and deportation are not conflated. This case does not establish extradition of US citizens.

Gaps. Formal MLA, a separate P component, regularity and the number of refusals were not established.

Reverse direction: CN→US = 6.0; E=6.0, J=?, P=6.0. Equal totals were obtained independently; component coverage and precedents must be compared separately.

US → AE: 6.0

Components: E=?, J=?, P=6.0. Confidence: medium.

Facts and analytical conclusion. US agencies participated in a specific operation involving arrests in Dubai and parallel investigations. P assesses practical coordination, not an agreement's existence on paper.

Evidence base: C06. Direct sources: S07: DOJ: joint operation against scam centres.

Law, citizenship and limitations. US extradition restrictions remain applicable. The nationalities of participants in a joint operation do not establish the possibility of extraditing US citizens.

Gaps. No verified extradition from the United States to the UAE or separately executed MLA request was found; arrests in Dubai are not such examples.

Reverse direction: AE→US = 6.0; E=6.0, J=?, P=6.0. Equal totals were obtained independently; component coverage and precedents must be compared separately.

US → RS: 5.0

Components: E=?, J=?, P=5.0. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. An information channel actually operating between the FBI and Serbia's Interior Ministry is officially described. This is sufficient for provisional P, but its age and narrow cyber focus do not justify calling current cooperation intensive.

Evidence base: C07. Direct sources: S08: Government of Serbia: Interior Ministry and FBI cooperation.

Law, citizenship and limitations. The extradition treaty has been in force since 23 April 2019; it is not itself converted into E. Extradition of a Serbian citizen from Serbia to the United States does not establish reverse practice.

Gaps. Current outcomes of Serbian requests to the United States and actual extradition from the United States were not established.

Reverse direction: RS→US = 6.0; E=6.0, J=?, P=6.0. The difference follows from the independent precedents and component composition described above, not a mirrored score.

US → MY: 6.6

Components: E=6.0, J=8.0, P=?. Confidence: medium.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Ng's actual temporary return yields E=6. Repeated large asset returns through US judicial procedures justify J=8 within the confirmed 1MDB segment. The high J is not generalized to all criminal cases.

Evidence base: C10 C12. Direct sources: S11: DOJ: Roger Ng's extradition from Malaysia; S13: Scoop: police confirm Roger Ng's arrival in Malaysia; S14: DOJ: a total of USD 1.4 billion returned to Malaysia in the 1MDB case.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Ng is a Malaysian citizen; his return is procedurally conditional and does not overturn US decisions.

Gaps. No overall dataset of executed MLA requests and refusals is available; P is not separately inferred from asset-return procedures.

Reverse direction: MY→US = 6.5; E=6.5, J=?, P=?. The difference follows from the independent precedents and component composition described above, not a mirrored score.

US → ID: 5.0

Components: E=5.0, J=?, P=?. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Wijaya's return at Indonesia's request confirms a real possibility of assistance. A functioning alternative mechanism supports a provisional E, although an observation from 2006 is insufficient to establish current sustained practice.

Evidence base: C14. Direct sources: S16: US State Department: David Nusa Wijaya's return.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Return through visa proceedings is not described as extradition. Citizenship cannot be inferred from the country of conviction.

Gaps. No recent equivalent or refusal statistics were found. A technically inaccessible archival item was checked using indexed text; this further limits confidence.

Reverse direction: ID→US = 5.5; E=5.5, J=?, P=?. The difference follows from the independent precedents and component composition described above, not a mirrored score.

US → TR: 5.0

Components: E=5.0, J=?, P=?. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. The judicial finding that extradition is admissible demonstrates that the mechanism used functions. E=5 accounts for the substantial gap between judicial authorization and proven actual transfer.

Evidence base: C15. Direct sources: S17: Reuters: court authorizes extradition of Eylem Tok and Timur Cihantimur; S18: Turkish Minute: Tok and Cihantimur case remains at the handover-decision stage.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Judicial certification and the final executive decision are distinct. Political disputes concerning other Turkish requests do not replace this ordinary criminal case's facts.

Gaps. Delivery of Tok and Cihantimur was unconfirmed as of the cutoff; its absence from the reports found is not an official refusal.

Reverse direction: TR→US = 6.0; E=6.0, J=?, P=?. The difference follows from the independent precedents and component composition described above, not a mirrored score.

RU — Russia provides assistance

RU → US: 3.0

Components: E=?, J=?, P=3.0. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. REvil confirms practical Russian action in support of a US investigation. The subsequent suspension of working dialogue limits its applicability to the current period; P=3, without concluding that channels are entirely absent.

Evidence base: C03. Direct sources: S03: Reuters / Euronews: REvil arrests at the United States' request; S04: CyberScoop: termination of working cooperation on REvil.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Russia does not extradite its own citizens; this does not prohibit every transfer of a foreigner. Snowden is considered separately and is not used as a universal ordinary criminal refusal.

Gaps. Current sustained execution of US requests and formal MLA was not established.

Reverse direction: US→RU = 3.4; E=4.0, J=2.0, P=?. The difference follows from the independent precedents and component composition described above, not a mirrored score.

RU → CN: 6.0

Components: E=6.0, J=?, P=?. Confidence: medium.

Facts and analytical conclusion. A recent completed extradition in a murder case supports E=6. One such episode is insufficient for regularity at levels 7–8.

Evidence base: C18. Direct sources: S21: Russian Interior Ministry: Xu Wenbin extradited to China.

Law, citizenship and limitations. The RU–CN legal assistance and extradition treaties have been in force since 1993 and 1997. The extradited person was Chinese, not Russian.

Gaps. Separate executed J and P were not established; possible sentencing assurances were not published in the material used.

Reverse direction: CN→RU = 6.0; E=6.0, J=?, P=?. Equal totals were obtained independently; component coverage and precedents must be compared separately.

RU → AE: 5.5

Components: E=5.5, J=?, P=?. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. The report of the completed transfer of two Kazakh individuals directly concerns this direction. It supports a cautious numerical E; absence of a separate official instrument lowers confidence but does not automatically require null.

Evidence base: C20. Direct sources: S23: BUSINESS Online: Russia's handover of individuals involved in the attack on Sabirov.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Third-country citizenship avoids conflating the case with Russia's ban on extraditing its own nationals. A formal exchange agreement is not inferred.

Gaps. The exact handover date, judicial conditions and legal mechanism were not verified through a primary document; the asserted exchange remains unproven.

Reverse direction: AE→RU = 6.0; E=6.0, J=?, P=?. The difference follows from the independent precedents and component composition described above, not a mirrored score.

RU → RS: 5.5

Components: E=5.5, J=?, P=?. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Karabašević's admission to a Serbian prison after extradition from Russia confirms the final outcome. E=5.5 reflects a functioning mechanism with narrowly and not recently observed practice.

Evidence base: C22. Direct sources: S25: Telegraf: Slaviša Karabašević admitted to a Serbian prison after transfer from Russia.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Russia's Justice Ministry lists the 1962 treaty with Yugoslavia for relations with Serbia. A Serbian citizen was extradited; this case did not test the rule on Russian citizens.

Gaps. Recent execution and systematic exchange of evidence were not established.

Reverse direction: RS→RU = 7.0; E=7.0, J=?, P=?. The difference follows from the independent precedents and component composition described above, not a mirrored score.

RU → MY: null

Components: E=?, J=?, P=?. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. No sufficiently substantiated directional outcome was found for any component; negotiations and general Interpol participation do not substitute for one.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Possible multilateral grounds do not establish execution. The restriction concerning Russian citizenship does not mean a ban on extraditing foreigners.

Gaps. No verified person transferred by Russia to Malaysia, Russian execution of MLA or specific information response was found.

Reverse direction: MY→RU = 5.0; E=5.0, J=?, P=?. A difference from a number, or two matching null values, does not establish different willingness: it reflects the evidence established for each direction.

Targeted search: Searches covered Russia/Malaysia extradition and deportation, “extradition Russia to Malaysia”, refusals, mutual legal assistance and police information exchange; the reverse direction was checked separately. ASEAN and multilateral MH17 materials did not provide a sufficient bilateral outcome.

RU → ID: null

Components: E=?, J=?, P=?. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Treaty mechanisms exist, but the specific report found on seven requests describes Indonesia's actions on Russian requests, not the reverse.

Law, citizenship and limitations. MLA has been in force since 18 December 2021; the extradition treaty was signed on 31 March 2023 and, according to Russia's Justice Ministry list, has been in force since 22 March 2026. Entry into force is not execution.

Gaps. No executed Indonesian request to Russia was found under E, J or P.

Reverse direction: ID→RU = 5.7; E=6.0, J=5.0, P=?. A difference from a number, or two matching null values, does not establish different willingness: it reflects the evidence established for each direction.

Targeted search: Separate searches covered “Russia extradited/deported to Indonesia”, extradition of an Indonesian from Russia, “Russia Indonesia MLA requests” and police cooperation. Treaties and the Indonesian statement of 24 June 2026 were checked; the latter applies only to ID→RU.

RU → TR: 6.0

Components: E=6.0, J=?, P=?. Confidence: medium.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Paksoy's transfer in 2024 is a direct ordinary criminal precedent sufficient for E=6. It does not establish broad regularity.

Evidence base: C24. Direct sources: S28: Vedomosti: Russia hands Levent Aslan Paksoy over to Turkey.

Law, citizenship and limitations. The 2014 legal assistance and extradition treaty has been in force since 21 July 2017. Paksoy is Turkish; the ban on extraditing Russian citizens is unaffected.

Gaps. No independent J/P execution was found in the verified sample.

Reverse direction: TR→RU = 7.0; E=7.0, J=?, P=?. The difference follows from the independent precedents and component composition described above, not a mirrored score.

CN — China provides assistance

CN → US: 6.0

Components: E=6.0, J=?, P=6.0. Confidence: medium.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Both the actual transfer of a wanted person to the United States and Chinese contributions to specific investigations were established in 2026. This is substantially stronger than an inference from Snowden's single political case.

Evidence base: C04 C05 C06. Direct sources: S05: China's Ministry of Justice: Liu's return from the United States; S06: SCIO: handover of a person wanted by the United States; S07: DOJ: joint operation against scam centres.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Mainland China is distinguished from Hong Kong. The ban on extraditing own nationals prevents generalizing these outcomes to Chinese citizens.

Gaps. Transfer conditions, C05's citizenship and MLA volumes are unknown. Police exchange of evidentiary material is not equated with formal J.

Reverse direction: US→CN = 6.0; E=6.0, J=?, P=?. Equal totals were obtained independently; component coverage and precedents must be compared separately.

CN → RU: 6.0

Components: E=6.0, J=?, P=?. Confidence: medium.

Facts and analytical conclusion. The completed transfer of a Russian defendant in 2026 confirms a functioning E channel in a corruption case.

Evidence base: C19. Direct sources: S22: Russian Interior Ministry: defendant accused of bribery intermediation extradited from China.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Bilateral treaties apply; the transferred person was Russian, so the case does not overcome China's restriction concerning its own nationals.

Gaps. Refusal frequency and independent J/P practice were not established.

Reverse direction: RU→CN = 6.0; E=6.0, J=?, P=?. Equal totals were obtained independently; component coverage and precedents must be compared separately.

CN → AE: 5.0

Components: E=?, J=?, P=5.0. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Chinese authorities took part in a specific coordinated operation against Dubai scam centres. This supports provisional P=5, subject to limited transparency about the bilateral information contribution.

Evidence base: C06. Direct sources: S07: DOJ: joint operation against scam centres.

Law, citizenship and limitations. A joint operation does not establish E/J. A suspect's Chinese citizenship matters for future extradition but not for the established interagency participation.

Gaps. A separate UAE request, the contents of material provided by China and actual extradition from China are unpublished.

Reverse direction: AE→CN = 6.5; E=6.5, J=?, P=?. The difference follows from the independent precedents and component composition described above, not a mirrored score.

CN → RS: null

Components: E=?, J=?, P=?. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. The search identified institutional contacts and police patrols, but insufficient evidence that China executed a Serbian criminal request.

Law, citizenship and limitations. China's ratification of the extradition treaty on 12 September 2025 does not itself confirm entry into force or execution. C32 concerns the reverse direction.

Gaps. No specific extradition, executed MLA or information response suitable for a P assessment was found.

Reverse direction: RS→CN = 6.0; E=6.0, J=?, P=?. A difference from a number, or two matching null values, does not establish different willingness: it reflects the evidence established for each direction.

Targeted search: Searches covered “China extradited to Serbia”, 中国 塞尔维亚 引渡, mutual legal assistance, police information exchange and refusals. Joint patrols and ratification were checked; tourist patrols were not treated as processing criminal information requests.

CN → MY: 6.0

Components: E=?, J=?, P=6.0. Confidence: medium.

Facts and analytical conclusion. China's provision of interrogation information is directly linked to subsequent Malaysian action. This is sufficiently specific information assistance for P=6.

Evidence base: C30. Direct sources: S36: CNA: joint investigation of the MBI Ponzi scheme.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Police exchange is distinguished from legally admissible evidentiary assistance; Teow's citizenship does not establish extradition of Chinese citizens.

Gaps. Completed formal MLA was not confirmed; receipt of documents requested later cannot be assumed. Teow's extradition from Thailand does not count toward E for this pair.

Reverse direction: MY→CN = 5.5; E=?, J=?, P=5.5. The difference follows from the independent precedents and component composition described above, not a mirrored score.

CN → ID: 6.0

Components: E=6.0, J=?, P=?. Confidence: medium.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Polri confirmed the transfer of Indonesian suspect KT from China in 2026. One episode is sufficient for E=6, without automatically adding J/P.

Evidence base: C29. Direct sources: S34: Polri: reciprocal handover of fugitives between Indonesia and China; S35: Polri: deportation of Chinese fugitive XP.

Law, citizenship and limitations. KT is Indonesian; this case does not test the ban on extraditing Chinese citizens. Reverse transfers are supported by separate facts.

Gaps. Precise assurances and the set of refusals are unpublished.

Reverse direction: ID→CN = 7.0; E=7.0, J=?, P=?. The difference follows from the independent precedents and component composition described above, not a mirrored score.

CN → TR: null

Components: E=?, J=?, P=?. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Treaty and political context was found, but no Chinese outcome on a Turkish criminal request could be substantiated.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Signing an extradition treaty and Chinese ratification do not establish its entry into force for both sides. The Turkish parliamentary procedure was checked separately.

Gaps. No E/J/P execution was found; Turkey's refusal in C33 is not an action by China.

Reverse direction: TR→CN = 4.0; E=4.0, J=?, P=?. A difference from a number, or two matching null values, does not establish different willingness: it reflects the evidence established for each direction.

Targeted search: Searches covered “China extradition to Turkey”, Chinese extradition to Turkey, 中国 土耳其 引渡, criminal mutual legal assistance and information sharing; agreement statuses and the reverse Yapuquan case were checked. Cooperation statements found contain no verifiable CN→TR execution.

AE — United Arab Emirates provides assistance

AE → US: 6.0

Components: E=6.0, J=?, P=6.0. Confidence: medium.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Hushpuppi's expulsion supports E; the 2026 operation confirms current operational coordination. Taken together, these go beyond a declaration of partnership.

Evidence base: C17 C06. Direct sources: S20: DOJ: sentencing of Ramon Abbas / Hushpuppi, previously expelled from the UAE; S07: DOJ: joint operation against scam centres.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Hushpuppi is Nigerian; his expulsion does not establish extradition of UAE citizens and is not termed extradition.

Gaps. Separate formal MLA and a representative proportion of executed extraditions are unknown.

Reverse direction: US→AE = 6.0; E=?, J=?, P=6.0. Equal totals were obtained independently; component coverage and precedents must be compared separately.

AE → RU: 6.0

Components: E=6.0, J=?, P=?. Confidence: medium.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Sabirov's handover in the Ponzi scheme case directly confirms practical assistance in December 2025. E=6 does not require a complete statistical dataset.

Evidence base: C21. Direct sources: S24: RBC: Edvard Sabirov deported from the UAE.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Deportation differs from an extradition decision. Claims about Sabirov's second citizenship and a legal exchange are not used as the basis for the score.

Gaps. One closely checked completed episode does not justify 8–10. Formal MLA and P were not separately assessed.

Reverse direction: RU→AE = 5.5; E=5.5, J=?, P=?. The difference follows from the independent precedents and component composition described above, not a mirrored score.

AE → CN: 6.5

Components: E=6.5, J=?, P=?. Confidence: medium.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Two completed episodes in different periods support recurrence; the recent 2025 case carries more weight. E=6.5 does not assume unknown regular statistics.

Evidence base: C31. Direct sources: S37: Gulf News: handover to China of a scam-website operator; S38: The Paper: Kan's extradition from the UAE to China.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Actual extraditions are established, but UAE citizenship of those extradited is not. Sources do not disclose possible assurances concerning punishment in China.

Gaps. High scores would require execution frequency, refusal types and coverage across different offences.

Reverse direction: CN→AE = 5.0; E=?, J=?, P=5.0. The difference follows from the independent precedents and component composition described above, not a mirrored score.

AE → RS: 6.0

Components: E=?, J=?, P=6.0. Confidence: medium.

Facts and analytical conclusion. The arrest in Dubai following a Serbian investigation and information exchange is specific executed police assistance.

Evidence base: C34. Direct sources: S41: WAM / Sharjah24: Operation Haris, UAE–Serbia cooperation.

Law, citizenship and limitations. A Red Notice is not equated with a judicial extradition decision. The case is an ordinary criminal one; it does not test political or citizenship boundaries.

Gaps. Eventual extradition to Serbia is unconfirmed. E is therefore unknown, although the arrest is a positive P outcome.

Reverse direction: RS→AE = 6.0; E=?, J=?, P=6.0. Equal totals were obtained independently; component coverage and precedents must be compared separately.

AE → MY: null

Components: E=?, J=?, P=?. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Financial-regulator agreements and general mechanisms found contain no established UAE execution of a Malaysian criminal request.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Regulatory MoUs are not equated with criminal legal assistance; the 1MDB case does not itself establish UAE action in this direction.

Gaps. No person actually transferred to MY, executed MLA or specific police material was found.

Reverse direction: MY→AE = null; E=?, J=?, P=?. A difference from a number, or two matching null values, does not establish different willingness: it reflects the evidence established for each direction.

Targeted search: Searches covered “UAE extradited/deported to Malaysia”, “Malaysia UAE criminal legal assistance”, police information, 1MDB and wanted-person searches. The official UAE agreement list was checked; regulatory contacts did not yield assessable E/J/P.

AE → ID: null

Components: E=?, J=?, P=?. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Extradition and legal assistance treaties appear in the official list, but specific execution for Indonesia is unconfirmed.

Law, citizenship and limitations. A signed treaty does not substitute for practice. Reports of fugitives being in Dubai do not establish their extradition.

Gaps. None of the material found establishes a completed transfer of a person or execution of a J/P request.

Reverse direction: ID→AE = null; E=?, J=?, P=?. A difference from a number, or two matching null values, does not establish different willingness: it reflects the evidence established for each direction.

Targeted search: Searches covered “UAE Indonesia extradition”, “fugitive Dubai Indonesia”, MLA, police assistance and cases of wanted Indonesians, including Riza Chalid. Agreements and police reports were checked; unconfirmed return reports were excluded.

AE → TR: null

Components: E=?, J=?, P=?. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Turkish requests are confirmed, but no outcome sufficient for E was found. Absence of a public response is not recorded as a substantive official refusal.

Law, citizenship and limitations. The treaty was signed on 19 July 2023; the 2025 parliamentary report is not independent confirmation of entry into force. Outcomes of eight UAE requests to Turkey cannot be inverted.

Gaps. Turkey's parliamentary report lists 15 Turkish requests to the UAE but does not give the outcomes of those particular requests; J/P were not established either.

Reverse direction: TR→AE = 6.0; E=6.0, J=?, P=?. A difference from a number, or two matching null values, does not establish different willingness: it reflects the evidence established for each direction.

Targeted search: Searches covered “UAE extradition Turkey”, “BAE Türkiye iade”, Sedat Peker, MLA and police cooperation. The parliamentary report and statements about requests were checked; arrests or requests without a final outcome were not described as execution.

RS — Serbia provides assistance

RS → US: 6.0

Components: E=6.0, J=?, P=6.0. Confidence: medium.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Stojilkovic's completed extradition and separate, more recent arrests in a US case support two components. Stojilkovic's consent limits generalization about E.

Evidence base: C08 C09. Direct sources: S09: DOJ: Antonije Stojilkovic's extradition in a fraud case; S10: DOJ: arrest of two foreign nationals in Serbia in a US stalking case.

Law, citizenship and limitations. The 2019 treaty was applied in practice, including to a Serbian citizen. C09's politically sensitive nature limits its use to P.

Gaps. Refusal numbers and executed J are unknown; the 2025 arrests are not recorded as new extraditions.

Reverse direction: US→RS = 5.0; E=?, J=?, P=5.0. The difference follows from the independent precedents and component composition described above, not a mirrored score.

RS → RU: 7.0

Components: E=7.0, J=?, P=?. Confidence: medium.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Two completed episodes in 2025–2026 involving different ordinary criminal cases support E=7. This assesses observed recurrence, not a success rate.

Evidence base: C23. Direct sources: S26: Russian Interior Ministry: Ara Bagdasaryan extradited from Serbia; S27: Russian Interior Ministry: extradition from Serbia of a person wanted in a drug case.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Russian nationals were extradited. An active legal channel does not remove Serbian extradition conditions, protection against political persecution or prohibitions concerning particular categories of individuals.

Gaps. All refusals and J/P coverage are unknown; the institutional and statistical picture is insufficient for level 8.

Reverse direction: RU→RS = 5.5; E=5.5, J=?, P=?. The difference follows from the independent precedents and component composition described above, not a mirrored score.

RS → CN: 6.0

Components: E=6.0, J=?, P=?. Confidence: medium.

Facts and analytical conclusion. An official source confirms the sequence of request, arrest and actual return of Fan Jiping. The case falls within the five-year window.

Evidence base: C32. Direct sources: S39: China's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection: Fan Jiping's extradition from Serbia.

Law, citizenship and limitations. The 2021 transfer could not have relied on the future treaty ratified by China in 2025. The source does not disclose the precise treaty or non-treaty basis used.

Gaps. Additional executed E/J/P and reasons for possible refusals were not established.

Reverse direction: CN→RS = null; E=?, J=?, P=?. A difference from a number, or two matching null values, does not establish different willingness: it reflects the evidence established for each direction.

RS → AE: 6.0

Components: E=?, J=?, P=6.0. Confidence: medium.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Serbian identification and provision of information enabled Dubai Police action. This separately demonstrates Serbia's contribution, rather than mechanically copying AE→RS.

Evidence base: C34. Direct sources: S41: WAM / Sharjah24: Operation Haris, UAE–Serbia cooperation.

Law, citizenship and limitations. An ordinary criminal murder investigation is underway. This police exchange does not test limits on extraditing own nationals.

Gaps. Independent extradition to the UAE and legal transfer of evidence are unconfirmed.

Reverse direction: AE→RS = 6.0; E=?, J=?, P=6.0. Equal totals were obtained independently; component coverage and precedents must be compared separately.

RS → MY: null

Components: E=?, J=?, P=?. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Targeted searching found no assessable outcome for any component.

Law, citizenship and limitations. The ability to make a request under national law and multilateral agreements does not itself earn a score.

Gaps. No verified Serbian execution of a Malaysian criminal request was found.

Reverse direction: MY→RS = null; E=?, J=?, P=?. A difference from a number, or two matching null values, does not establish different willingness: it reflects the evidence established for each direction.

Targeted search: Searches covered “Serbia Malaysia extradition”, “izručenje Malezija”, mutual legal assistance and police information exchange in both directions. Diplomatic contacts contain no individual or aggregate outcome.

RS → ID: 6.0

Components: E=6.0, J=?, P=?. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Lumowa's actual delivery confirms functioning extradition of a third-country national. E is therefore numerical, although no series of cases was found.

Evidence base: C36. Direct sources: S43: Jakarta Post: Maria Pauline Lumowa arrives from Serbia.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Lumowa is not assigned Indonesian citizenship: she holds a Dutch passport. Completed extradition matters more than the absence of a bilateral treaty from the sample.

Gaps. The 2020 case predates the main window; current J/P were not established.

Reverse direction: ID→RS = 5.5; E=5.5, J=?, P=?. The difference follows from the independent precedents and component composition described above, not a mirrored score.

RS → TR: 5.0

Components: E=5.0, J=?, P=5.0. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. The aggregate of completed extraditions and description of an ongoing police channel yield E/P=5. Mixed outcomes and the absence of an offence breakdown prevent rating ordinary criminal extradition as consistently high.

Evidence base: C38 C39. Direct sources: S45: Radio Slobodna Evropa: Turkish requests and extraditions from Serbia; S46: Amnesty: Ecevit Piroğlu's detention and risk of extradition; S47: Government of Serbia: ongoing police cooperation between Serbia and Turkey.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Piroğlu illustrates political exceptions; his prolonged detention does not turn a judicial refusal into actual extradition.

Gaps. The offences in the five extradited cases, the fate of remaining requests and formal MLA are unknown. One political refusal does not cancel the positive body of cases.

Reverse direction: TR→RS = 5.0; E=?, J=?, P=5.0. Equal totals were obtained independently; component coverage and precedents must be compared separately.

MY — Malaysia provides assistance

MY → US: 6.5

Components: E=6.5, J=?, P=?. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Own national Ng and third-country national Hussein were transferred. Two separate precedents provide somewhat more evidence than one transfer, but both predate the main window.

Evidence base: C10 C11. Direct sources: S11: DOJ: Roger Ng's extradition from Malaysia; S13: Scoop: police confirm Roger Ng's arrival in Malaysia; S12: DOJ: Louay Ibrahim Hussein's extradition.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Ng consented to extradition; this materially affects generalizability. Malaysian citizenship was not an absolute practical obstacle in this verified case.

Gaps. There is no sufficiently current series to confidently describe a sustained level of 7–8. J/P are not separately inferred from E.

Reverse direction: US→MY = 6.6; E=6.0, J=8.0, P=?. The difference follows from the independent precedents and component composition described above, not a mirrored score.

MY → RU: 5.0

Components: E=5.0, J=?, P=?. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. One completed return in a financial case is confirmed by a direct Interior Ministry quotation. E=5 reflects an alternative channel that operated, with current recurrence unknown.

Evidence base: C26. Direct sources: S31: Business FM / Interior Ministry: deportation of a Nizhny Novgorod entrepreneur from Malaysia.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Deportation, not extradition, is recorded. The case concerns a person wanted by Russia and does not test transfer of Malaysian citizens to Russia.

Gaps. No newly confirmed episode or J/P outcomes were found.

Reverse direction: RU→MY = null; E=?, J=?, P=?. A difference from a number, or two matching null values, does not establish different willingness: it reflects the evidence established for each direction.

MY → CN: 5.5

Components: E=?, J=?, P=5.5. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Malaysian arrests and financial measures formed part of a joint investigation into Chinese losses. This is a specific practical contribution sufficient for provisional P.

Evidence base: C30. Direct sources: S36: CNA: joint investigation of the MBI Ponzi scheme.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Malaysia is not credited with extraditing Teow: he was transferred to China from Thailand. Financial measures in Malaysia are not equivalent to an already completed return of assets to China.

Gaps. Unlike CN→MY, the precise reverse delivery of an information package is not described. E and formal J remain unknown.

Reverse direction: CN→MY = 6.0; E=?, J=?, P=6.0. The difference follows from the independent precedents and component composition described above, not a mirrored score.

MY → AE: null

Components: E=?, J=?, P=?. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Regulatory agreements and general statements did not establish execution of a UAE request.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Malaysia's extradition law does not establish practice specifically with the UAE.

Gaps. No MY→AE case involving a person's transfer, executed MLA or a police information response was found.

Reverse direction: AE→MY = null; E=?, J=?, P=?. A difference from a number, or two matching null values, does not establish different willingness: it reflects the evidence established for each direction.

Targeted search: Separate searches covered “Malaysia extradited to UAE”, “Malaysia Dubai fugitive”, extradition refusal, mutual legal assistance and intelligence sharing. Financial-regulator agreements were checked; no criminal outcome was established.

MY → RS: null

Components: E=?, J=?, P=?. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. No directional evidence supports assessing even one component.

Law, citizenship and limitations. National extradition powers and Interpol membership are insufficient for assessment without a practical episode.

Gaps. Transfer of a person or material from Malaysia to Serbia was not established.

Reverse direction: RS→MY = null; E=?, J=?, P=?. A difference from a number, or two matching null values, does not establish different willingness: it reflects the evidence established for each direction.

Targeted search: Searches covered “Malaysia Serbia extradition/deportation”, “Serbian fugitive Malaysia”, legal assistance and police cooperation. The reverse direction was searched separately; no specific MY→RS outcome was found.

MY → ID: 7.0

Components: E=7.0, J=?, P=?. Confidence: medium.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Two confirmed returns in different periods, including a recent 2026 case, show recurring practical assistance. Different offence categories and third-country citizenship are taken into account.

Evidence base: C40. Direct sources: S48: Bernama: Djoko Tjandra's return from Malaysia; S49: ABC: Djoko Tjandra's Papua New Guinean citizenship; S50: Polri: suspect MKA's return from Malaysia.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Returns are not automatically described as formal extradition. Tjandra's citizenship is Papua New Guinean, not simply that of the requesting agency's country.

Gaps. Legal assistance and police responses were not separately assessed; there is no complete set of refusals.

Reverse direction: ID→MY = 5.5; E=5.5, J=?, P=?. The difference follows from the independent precedents and component composition described above, not a mirrored score.

MY → TR: 5.0

Components: E=5.0, J=?, P=?. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. The actual handover of three people confirms the possibility of E assistance. However, the only established group concerns politically sensitive allegations and 2017; the assessment is strictly provisional.

Evidence base: C42. Direct sources: S52: Anadolu: Malaysia hands three suspects over to Turkey.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Alleged links to Gülen are not treated as proven guilt. Immigration transfer does not establish a universal extradition procedure.

Gaps. Ordinary criminal practice, current requests and independent judicial review of transfer grounds were not established.

Reverse direction: TR→MY = 5.0; E=5.0, J=?, P=?. Equal totals were obtained independently; component coverage and precedents must be compared separately.

ID — Indonesia provides assistance

ID → US: 5.5

Components: E=5.5, J=?, P=?. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. The FBI confirmed Sales's completed return in a financial case in detail. E=5.5 recognizes a functioning channel without attributing current regularity to one old case.

Evidence base: C13. Direct sources: S15: FBI: Richard Macadangdang Sales returned from Indonesia.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Deportation followed by arrest in US territory, not ordinary extradition. Sales's citizenship is not inferred from US charges.

Gaps. New comparable executions and formal J/P were not established.

Reverse direction: US→ID = 5.0; E=5.0, J=?, P=?. The difference follows from the independent precedents and component composition described above, not a mirrored score.

ID → RU: 5.7

Components: E=6.0, J=5.0, P=?. Confidence: medium.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Kovalenko's completed deportation yields E=6. A recent official breakdown of MLA confirms J but shows mixed outcomes, hence J=5.

Evidence base: C27 C28. Direct sources: S32: Russian Interior Ministry: Andrey Kovalenko delivered from Indonesia; S33: ANTARA: execution of Russian legal assistance requests.

Law, citizenship and limitations. The old deportation predates the extradition treaty. Its entry into force in 2026 and existing MLA complement, but do not replace, practice.

Gaps. The reason for the single refusal and request categories are undisclosed; the three pending requests cannot be counted as Indonesian refusals.

Reverse direction: RU→ID = null; E=?, J=?, P=?. A difference from a number, or two matching null values, does not establish different willingness: it reflects the evidence established for each direction.

ID → CN: 7.0

Components: E=7.0, J=?, P=?. Confidence: medium.

Facts and analytical conclusion. The group's handover in 2026 and XP's separate deportation in 2025 confirm recurrence. E=7 therefore has a broader basis than the single reverse transfer of KT.

Evidence base: C29. Direct sources: S34: Polri: reciprocal handover of fugitives between Indonesia and China; S35: Polri: deportation of Chinese fugitive XP.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Repatriation, deportation and officially designated extradition are distinguished. The individuals are Chinese; Indonesia's citizenship exception was not tested.

Gaps. Refusal numbers and executed MLA are unknown; a group of people is not interpreted as numerous independent operations.

Reverse direction: CN→ID = 6.0; E=6.0, J=?, P=?. The difference follows from the independent precedents and component composition described above, not a mirrored score.

ID → AE: null

Components: E=?, J=?, P=?. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Official treaties were found, but practical execution from Indonesia to the UAE was not.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Extradition and MLA treaties are not converted into an average score without evidence that the mechanisms function.

Gaps. No directional E/J/P outcome was found.

Reverse direction: AE→ID = null; E=?, J=?, P=?. A difference from a number, or two matching null values, does not establish different willingness: it reflects the evidence established for each direction.

Targeted search: Searches covered “Indonesia extradited to UAE”, “Indonesia Dubai wanted”, “ekstradisi Uni Emirat Arab”, mutual legal assistance and police information. Agreements and reverse-direction statements about fugitives were checked separately; ID→AE execution was not established.

ID → RS: 5.5

Components: E=5.5, J=?, P=?. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Indonesia's minister explicitly identified Iliev's completed handover to Serbia. This is a sufficient single basis for E despite absent statistics.

Evidence base: C37. Direct sources: S44: ANTARA: Nikolov Iliev's transfer to Serbia in 2015.

Law, citizenship and limitations. The individual's Serbian citizenship matters; the case does not test Indonesia's refusal to extradite its own citizens. Reciprocity was mentioned, not an assumed treaty.

Gaps. The 2015 precedent was retrospectively described in 2020; no current E series or J/P outcomes were established.

Reverse direction: RS→ID = 6.0; E=6.0, J=?, P=?. The difference follows from the independent precedents and component composition described above, not a mirrored score.

ID → MY: 5.5

Components: E=5.5, J=?, P=?. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Jamal Yunos's deportation and appearance in a Malaysian court establish the final outcome. This is a functioning alternative channel, but insufficient evidence of current regularity.

Evidence base: C41. Direct sources: S51: Free Malaysia Today: Jamal Yunos appears in court after deportation.

Law, citizenship and limitations. A Malaysian citizen and an immigration transfer. The case is not described as surrender on a political charge or formal extradition.

Gaps. Detailed MLA and P outcomes were not found; the individual's public and political context limits comparability.

Reverse direction: MY→ID = 7.0; E=7.0, J=?, P=?. The difference follows from the independent precedents and component composition described above, not a mirrored score.

ID → TR: null

Components: E=?, J=?, P=?. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Reports found about Turkish citizens' removal for immigration violations do not establish assistance with a Turkish criminal request.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Ordinary deportation of a tourist is not included in E without a connection to B's search or criminal proceedings.

Gaps. No E/J/P outcome specifically supporting a Turkish investigation was found.

Reverse direction: TR→ID = 5.0; E=5.0, J=?, P=?. A difference from a number, or two matching null values, does not establish different willingness: it reflects the evidence established for each direction.

Targeted search: Searches covered “Indonesia extradited/deported Turkish fugitive”, “ekstradisi Turki”, refusals, MLA and police cooperation. Memorandums and immigration removals without a criminal request were excluded; group C44 relates only to the reverse direction.

TR — Turkey provides assistance

TR → US: 6.0

Components: E=6.0, J=?, P=?. Confidence: medium.

Facts and analytical conclusion. A recent report of Hilmi's actual arrival in Miami confirms cooperation in a major financial case. This is a later stage than that established in the reverse direction.

Evidence base: C16. Direct sources: S19: Hürriyet Daily News: Ibrahim Khaldoon Hilmi delivered to the United States.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Hilmi's citizenship is not established; it cannot be claimed that Turkey extradited its own citizen. The media's extradition wording is retained with a qualification.

Gaps. The legal transfer instrument and separate J/P outcomes were not found.

Reverse direction: US→TR = 5.0; E=5.0, J=?, P=?. The difference follows from the independent precedents and component composition described above, not a mirrored score.

TR → RU: 7.0

Components: E=7.0, J=?, P=?. Confidence: medium.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Two recent fraud-related transfers, including Finiko, support E=7. Political differences between the countries do not substitute for these actions.

Evidence base: C25. Direct sources: S29: RBC: deportation from Turkey of a defendant accused of real-estate fraud; S30: Interfax: Madiyarova transferred from Turkey in the Finiko case.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Both treaty and immigration channels are used. Outcomes concerning Russian fugitives do not establish extradition of Turkish citizens.

Gaps. Refusal frequency, all citizenships and separate J/P were not established.

Reverse direction: RU→TR = 6.0; E=6.0, J=?, P=?. The difference follows from the independent precedents and component composition described above, not a mirrored score.

TR → CN: 4.0

Components: E=4.0, J=?, P=?. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. A substantive judicial refusal concerning evidence quality demonstrates selective E. The score of 4 concerns a narrowly observed channel; it is not a low rating of ordinary criminal extraditions, none of which were established in the sample.

Evidence base: C33. Direct sources: S40: SCMP: Turkish court refuses to extradite Abudukadir Yapuquan.

Law, citizenship and limitations. The treaty's entry into force is unconfirmed. The requesting side's terrorism classification does not remove scrutiny of evidence and persecution risks.

Gaps. The main comparability limitation is that the sole basis is politically sensitive. The refusal cannot be generalized to every Chinese request; J/P are unknown.

Reverse direction: CN→TR = null; E=?, J=?, P=?. A difference from a number, or two matching null values, does not establish different willingness: it reflects the evidence established for each direction.

TR → AE: 6.0

Components: E=6.0, J=?, P=?. Confidence: medium.

Facts and analytical conclusion. The transfer of three Uzbek murder suspects supports E=6. Parliamentary information about other requests shows mixed outcomes, so no universally high score is assigned.

Evidence base: C35. Direct sources: S42: Reuters: Turkey's assistance in arresting suspects in Zvi Kogan's murder.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Third-country citizens, not Turkish nationals, were transferred. The 2023 treaty is not declared operational without confirmation of entry into force.

Gaps. According to the 2025 report, of eight UAE requests to Turkey, two were rejected, two closed and four under consideration; this is a separate set, not a proven breakdown of C35.

Reverse direction: AE→TR = null; E=?, J=?, P=?. A difference from a number, or two matching null values, does not establish different willingness: it reflects the evidence established for each direction.

TR → RS: 5.0

Components: E=?, J=?, P=5.0. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Ongoing joint police cooperation is officially described. Only P is counted, and only provisionally: the content of specific information responses is undisclosed.

Evidence base: C39. Direct sources: S47: Government of Serbia: ongoing police cooperation between Serbia and Turkey.

Law, citizenship and limitations. General claims of a “high level” are not treated as scores of 8–10. Police patrols do not test national extradition restrictions.

Gaps. Completed Turkish extradition to Serbia and formal MLA were not established.

Reverse direction: RS→TR = 5.0; E=5.0, J=?, P=5.0. Equal totals were obtained independently; component coverage and precedents must be compared separately.

TR → MY: 5.0

Components: E=5.0, J=?, P=?. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. Confirmed deportation of a Malaysian suspect permits an E assessment without requiring complete statistics. An old counterterrorism episode provides only a narrow provisional picture.

Evidence base: C43. Direct sources: S53: Malay Mail: deportation from Turkey of a suspected IS associate.

Law, citizenship and limitations. The person is Malaysian; the case does not test Turkey's ban on extraditing its own nationals. The mechanism is deportation, not established extradition.

Gaps. Current ordinary criminal practice and J/P outcomes are unknown.

Reverse direction: MY→TR = 5.0; E=5.0, J=?, P=?. Equal totals were obtained independently; component coverage and precedents must be compared separately.

TR → ID: 5.0

Components: E=5.0, J=?, P=?. Confidence: low.

Facts and analytical conclusion. The return of 14 Indonesians in 2025 confirms an active practical transfer channel. The group's composition and counterterrorism screening are not a series of judicial extraditions.

Evidence base: C44. Direct sources: S54: ANTARA / BNPT: 14 Indonesians deported from Turkey.

Law, citizenship and limitations. Indonesian citizens were transferred through immigration procedures. This is a narrow basis for E, not an assessment of willingness to extradite Turkish citizens.

Gaps. Individual criminal requests for each person, ordinary criminal executions and formal J/P were not established.

Reverse direction: ID→TR = null; E=?, J=?, P=?. A difference from a number, or two matching null values, does not establish different willingness: it reflects the evidence established for each direction.

Checking the original assertions

1. Edward Snowden — partly confirmed, with an important jurisdictional qualification

See C45. Snowden left the United States, stayed in Hong Kong and subsequently reached Russia; no transfer to the United States took place. Hong Kong's official statement of 23 June 2013 says that the material supplied by the US side was insufficient for provisional arrest and there was no legal basis to prevent departure. This is not an established substantive refusal by mainland China of ordinary criminal extradition. Russian citizenship was granted in 2022, so a citizenship barrier cannot retrospectively be treated as the reason for all decisions in 2013. The case concerns state secrets and political asylum; it was not used to zero out CN→US or RU→US.

Sources: S55: Government of Hong Kong: Edward Snowden's departure; S56: Forbes: Snowden granted Russian citizenship.

2. Kazakh individuals involved in the attack on Sabirov — partly confirmed

For the Russian branch, the names Yesbolat Kenzhegazy and Anorbek Tyumibayev were found (Latin spelling variants Kenzhegazy / Tyumibaev). BUSINESS Online's report of transfer from Russia is included directly in RU→AE as C20, with low confidence because of unnamed sources and the absence of a discovered transfer instrument.

The Turkish branch of this particular case could not be confirmed. A report of arrest in Istanbul does not yet establish handover to the UAE. C47 was checked separately: Zhanbolat Serikov was reported transferred from Azerbaijan, not Turkey, on 28 July 2025. Azerbaijan is outside the eight-country study. The claim that “Russia and Turkey extradited participants in this attack” is therefore not accepted in full. TR→AE is based on the different, independently confirmed C35 case. A legal exchange of defendants for Sabirov was not established.

Sources: S23: BUSINESS Online: Russia's handover of individuals involved in the attack on Sabirov; S57: Orda: Zhanbolat Serikov transferred to the UAE from Azerbaijan.

3. The UAE handed Edvard Sabirov over to Russia — confirmed, with the mechanism clarified

The actual handover on 10 December 2025 is confirmed. However, the verified Interior Ministry report describes deportation, so “extradition” is legally imprecise. C21 is counted in AE→RU as real assistance in a Ponzi scheme case; it is not discarded because an alternative mechanism was used.

Sources: S24: RBC: Edvard Sabirov deported from the UAE.

4. Erik Gafarov in Europe and Russia's request — partly confirmed; no refusal decision established

See C46. Russia's search for Gafarov and interest in his return are confirmed by reports citing Tatarstan's Interior Ministry. Media material names the Netherlands specifically; this is not evidence of a legally verified current residence. The information found does not establish the date of an official request to the Netherlands, its acceptance by a competent authority or a final judicial/executive decision. The claim that “the Netherlands refused extradition” is therefore unconfirmed. Reports of Turkish citizenship are not treated as verified passport facts. The Netherlands is not in the matrix; this story does not change the scores of Turkey, Serbia or any other country studied.

Sources: S58: 116.ru: Tatarstan Interior Ministry on the search for Erik Gafarov; S59: 116.ru: international search for Gafarov resumed; S60: Chelny Live: reports of Erik Gafarov's presence in the Netherlands.

Sources and gaps

Priority was given to government releases, laws, treaties and parliamentary material, followed by media, preferably identifying an official source. Multiple reprints of the same statement are not independent confirmations. Searches covered both directions of each pair, extraditions/deportations, refusals, MLA, police exchange, treaties and termination of cooperation; absence of a publication was not interpreted as refusal. Russian and English wording, Chinese terms 引渡/遣返, Turkish iade/BAE and Indonesian ekstradisi/deportasi were used where they helped refine results. This is a targeted review, not a reproducible exhaustive index of every judicial database.

Some government websites returned technical errors when opened directly; available indexed text was used in those cases, with the limitation reflected in the conclusions. Publication dates below are separated from event dates in the register. Reindexing dates are not treated as new case dates: in particular, the ICE removal in C01 occurred in 2020, not on the 2025 date encountered in search results.

Directions with null and missing evidence

  • RU→MY. Searches covered Russia/Malaysia extradition and deportation, “extradition Russia to Malaysia”, refusals, mutual legal assistance and police information exchange; the reverse direction was checked separately. ASEAN and multilateral MH17 materials did not provide a sufficient bilateral outcome. Evidence missing for a numerical assessment: No verified person transferred by Russia to Malaysia, Russian execution of MLA or specific information response was found.

  • RU→ID. Separate searches covered “Russia extradited/deported to Indonesia”, extradition of an Indonesian from Russia, “Russia Indonesia MLA requests” and police cooperation. Treaties and the Indonesian statement of 24 June 2026 were checked; the latter applies only to ID→RU. Evidence missing for a numerical assessment: No executed Indonesian request to Russia was found under E, J or P.

  • CN→RS. Searches covered “China extradited to Serbia”, 中国 塞尔维亚 引渡, mutual legal assistance, police information exchange and refusals. Joint patrols and ratification were checked; tourist patrols were not treated as processing criminal information requests. Evidence missing for a numerical assessment: No specific extradition, executed MLA or information response suitable for a P assessment was found.

  • CN→TR. Searches covered “China extradition to Turkey”, Chinese extradition to Turkey, 中国 土耳其 引渡, criminal mutual legal assistance and information sharing; agreement statuses and the reverse Yapuquan case were checked. Cooperation statements found contain no verifiable CN→TR execution. Evidence missing for a numerical assessment: No E/J/P execution was found; Turkey's refusal in C33 is not an action by China.

  • AE→MY. Searches covered “UAE extradited/deported to Malaysia”, “Malaysia UAE criminal legal assistance”, police information, 1MDB and wanted-person searches. The official UAE agreement list was checked; regulatory contacts did not yield assessable E/J/P. Evidence missing for a numerical assessment: No person actually transferred to MY, executed MLA or specific police material was found.

  • AE→ID. Searches covered “UAE Indonesia extradition”, “fugitive Dubai Indonesia”, MLA, police assistance and cases of wanted Indonesians, including Riza Chalid. Agreements and police reports were checked; unconfirmed return reports were excluded. Evidence missing for a numerical assessment: None of the material found establishes a completed transfer of a person or execution of a J/P request.

  • AE→TR. Searches covered “UAE extradition Turkey”, “BAE Türkiye iade”, Sedat Peker, MLA and police cooperation. The parliamentary report and statements about requests were checked; arrests or requests without a final outcome were not described as execution. Evidence missing for a numerical assessment: Turkey's parliamentary report lists 15 Turkish requests to the UAE but does not give the outcomes of those particular requests; J/P were not established either.

  • RS→MY. Searches covered “Serbia Malaysia extradition”, “izručenje Malezija”, mutual legal assistance and police information exchange in both directions. Diplomatic contacts contain no individual or aggregate outcome. Evidence missing for a numerical assessment: No verified Serbian execution of a Malaysian criminal request was found.

  • MY→AE. Separate searches covered “Malaysia extradited to UAE”, “Malaysia Dubai fugitive”, extradition refusal, mutual legal assistance and intelligence sharing. Financial-regulator agreements were checked; no criminal outcome was established. Evidence missing for a numerical assessment: No MY→AE case involving a person's transfer, executed MLA or a police information response was found.

  • MY→RS. Searches covered “Malaysia Serbia extradition/deportation”, “Serbian fugitive Malaysia”, legal assistance and police cooperation. The reverse direction was searched separately; no specific MY→RS outcome was found. Evidence missing for a numerical assessment: Transfer of a person or material from Malaysia to Serbia was not established.

  • ID→AE. Searches covered “Indonesia extradited to UAE”, “Indonesia Dubai wanted”, “ekstradisi Uni Emirat Arab”, mutual legal assistance and police information. Agreements and reverse-direction statements about fugitives were checked separately; ID→AE execution was not established. Evidence missing for a numerical assessment: No directional E/J/P outcome was found.

  • ID→TR. Searches covered “Indonesia extradited/deported Turkish fugitive”, “ekstradisi Turki”, refusals, MLA and police cooperation. Memorandums and immigration removals without a criminal request were excluded; group C44 relates only to the reverse direction. Evidence missing for a numerical assessment: No E/J/P outcome specifically supporting a Turkish investigation was found.

Treaty sources requiring particularly careful interpretation

The TBMM report of 6 May 2025 (page 7) contains two distinct sets: 15 Turkish requests to the UAE over a decade and eight UAE requests to Turkey. The breakdown of “two refusals, two closed, four pending” concerns the latter eight. It is not used as an indicator of UAE refusals to Turkey. China's ratification of its treaty with Serbia is likewise not automatically declared the date of entry into force for both parties.

Sources: L13: TBMM: committee report on the Turkey–UAE treaty; L12: Reuters: China ratifies extradition treaty with Serbia.

Bibliography

Access date for all listed sources: 15 October 2026. Where only a month or year is established, an exact day is not invented. Numeric dates use day.month.year.

Original structural and calculation checks

The original JSON contains eight outer keys in the order US, RU, CN, AE, RS, MY, ID, TR, with seven inner keys each and no self-relationships. There are 56 values: 44 numbers and 12 nulls. All numbers lie within 1.0–10.0 and have one decimal place. The matrix, directional headings and final scores were generated from the same E/J/P values; checks covered all directions, references to existing case identifiers and consistency with the formula. No unknown component was included in the denominator.

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